PREVIEW OF THE MF BOOK BY MARTIN JANOUŠEK,

WHICH IS A PART OF THE NEW LIMITED EDTION 2127

„MF“ KIT, (MIG-21M, MF AND MFN IN ČSLA, AČR AND ASR)

128 PAGES, 430 PHOTOS AND COLOR SCHEMES

FOR 39 MARKING OPTIONS INCLUDED IN THE MF KIT, CAT. NO. 2127.

THE BOOK IS AVAILABLE AS A PART OF THIS KIT

Václav Vébr

Pplk. v. v. Vaclav Vebr

Born: 1941; Entered Air Force: September, 1959

Air Units: LU 1959-1961, 11th slp. 7th slp, 1st slp

Aircraft: C-105, C-11, MiG-15, MiG-19S, MiG-21F, PF, PFM,

MF, U, US, UM, L-29, Z-142, Z-43, Z-256 AFS, L-60

Flight Time: Approximately 2200h, around 1500h in the MiG-21

Memories of the MiG-21MF

The MiG-21MF made itself significantly known through the

rapid reaction of the airplane to throttle movement. During

a flight in afterburner, and attaining a speed of M1.5, the

second burner zone automatically kicks in. The pilot would

get the distinct impression that the airplane got a kick in

the ass, but, naturally, at the cost of a higher fuel consumption. It was possible to turn off the second zone by throttling

back from full afterburner. The aircraft itself received an

additional pylon under each wing to allow for other weapons

to be carried, and it was possible to hang an auxiliary fuel

tank (500l) under each wing. Under the fuselage, there was

a twin-barrel GSh-23 23mm cannon. A marked improvement

of this version was the installation of a new autopilot, that

had two operational modes: the stabilization mode allowed

for the maintaining of the aircraft’s flight characteristics (inclination, climb or dive) on releasing the control stick, and

in the guidance mode, which, again after releasing the stick,

brought the aircraft back to horizontal level flight, or if already straight and level, to maintain altitude and course.

In concert with the radio altimeter, it would prevent the

aircraft from dropping below a preset ‘dangerous’ altitude.

In the cockpit, above the instrument panel, there was a new

gyroscopic gunsight. A shrouded screen displaying the fire

control radar data was installed on the instrument panel to

the right of the artificial horizon. At the top of the pilot’s

field of view, situational awareness was aided by the use of

a rear-view periscope. A disadvantage was that the cockpit

lost its radio compass tuning ability. There was only a set of

five buttons for chosen beacons that the groundcrew tuned

into the system from outside the cockpit.

At the time when the United States was introducing ‘flat

trajectory’ weapons, the question arose how best to confront this. The fighter air force was considered as part of the

solution, who was to train pilots on their search and interception. The radar could not locate such rounds at around

ground level, and so visual acquisition was seen as a viable

alternative followed by their destruction by cannon fire,

not unlike the destruction

of German V-1s over Britain

during the Second World War.

This problem was the focus

of several tactical training

exercises. Our targets were

usually provided by colleagues flying Su-7s flying at

100m altitude and at speeds

of over 900km/h. We would

visually acquire them in a

given grid location and our

goal was to get a simulated

good shot through the gun

camera. The new MFs were

the first of the MiG-21s allowed supersonic flight at

M1.05 at ground level. Of

course, this was in combat

scenarios. Under peacetime conditions, supersonic

speeds were restricted to

above 11km altitude in order to not cause damage in

the wake of the resulting

shock wave. If I was actually

able to acquire a visual on the target, it was necessary to

chase it down, and get within firing distance (about 300m)

and press home the attack. I spotted my Su at a distance of

about three kilometers, and went into pursuit mode. Such

a ground hugging flight at over 1,000km/h is a pretty demanding task. Besides watching the terrain, it was necessary

to maintain visual contact with your target, and maintain a

higher speed than it, in order to hope to catch it. So, you’re

in full burner with a constant eye on the machmeter in an

effort to not generate a sonic boom, constantly toggling between burner on and off, and also keeping a look out on the

fuel gage. At this altitude and in burner, the fuel consumption is enormous. When I finally chased my target down, I

received an emergency fuel reserve warning, and had to

break off the pursuit, meaning my intercept led to nothing.

On one of my first flights in the MF, after taking off and

a gentle climb to the north in full afterburner, I released

the stick and focused on switching radar and compass channels. The aircraft was stabilized by the autopilot, the speed

climbed to 950km/h, the flight was progressing well, up to

the moment when I grabbed the stick again. The aircraft began to shake in waves of positive and negative overloads that

were recorded by the flight recording system SARP within a

couple of seconds. I immediately released the control stick

again, and turned off the afterburner, throttled back to idle,

and drastically reduced my speed using the speed brakes. At

500km/h the aircraft began to behave normally, and I realized what had just happened.

It was very important after takeoff and during increasing

speed to monitor what we called the ‘strong arm’ signal until it turned off, and watched the ARU indicator, that was to

move towards the ‘small arm’ zone. The ARU was an indicator that displayed the changing relationship between the

control stick and stabilizer deflection depending on speed

and altitude of flight. At a higher speed, the rudder tended

to be more effective, leading to the possibility of exceeding

dangerous load tolerances. In my case, ‘strong arm’ never

turned off, the autopilot stabilized the flight parameters,

and my failure to monitor gave rise to a very dangerous

situation that thankfully turned out well. Under speeds of

500km/h, the ‘strong arm’ regime is the correct one, and

prior to landing, it is necessary to monitor it’s signal coming

on. The landing was exactly as it should be. On the ground,

technicians discovered a fault in the ARU in the electronic

connections. It was certainly a lesson for me with regards to

the importance of procedures, and maintaining them, and

failure to do so can be extremely expensive.