Photo taken from a Boeing B-17 of 95th BG during a raid on Mainz on September 8, 1944.

Photo: Museum of Air Battle Over the Ore Mountains Archives

Oil Campaign

With the Battle for Berlin at the end, the combined bombing offensive ceased as well. Until May 1944 the Allied Air Forces defined the

priority tasks: the attacks on the cities, the attacks on the V-1 launching pads and the attacks on the German railway system. On May 8

the USAAF launched the Oil Campaign with the German fuel industry

as a main target. The USAAF day bombers have become the primary

opponents of the German fighters. In the end of 1943, and in the first

half of 1944, the power balance in the battlefield changed. With the

USAAF arrival in ETO and its growing combat capability and above all

introduction of P-51B to the escort fighter groups, the German fighter

units were under the extreme pressure. It rapidly turned out that

they were falling behind in terms of organization, technology as well

as personnel. It was necessary to quickly replenish the fighter units

ranks. Therefore, as early as spring 1944, the majority of Wilde Sau

units were gradually integrated into the Reichsverteidigung (RLV) system and deployed in the day fighting against the American bombing

force.

The tactics

After the successful deployment of Sturmstaffel 1, in summer the

Sturmgruppen IV.(Sturm)/JG 3, IV.(Sturm)JG 4 and II.(Sturm)/JG 300

were established and equipped with heavy, armored Fw 190A-8/R2.

The first combat debut of the new Sturmgruppen took place on July

7, 1944 during the raid on Leipzig. The new tactics of attacking the

American formations further relied on the fighter formations called

Gefechtsverbände concentrated around heavy Sturmgruppen attacking the bombers with their Fw 190A-8 and Fw 190A-8/R2 and the

units equipped with the lighter Bf 109G that would provide the top

cover against the American escort fighter arriving at the higher altitu-

INFO Eduard - July 2021

de. Since summer 1944 the Gruppe JG 300 and JG 301 were deployed

as a fighter cover for the heavy fighters Fw 190A-8/R2 in this manner,

since the fall equipped with Bf 109G-14/AS and later (since December

1944) with Bf-109G-10. In the dogfight with American fighter escorts,

which were in summer and fall practically exclusively equipped with

powerful P-51D Mustang surpassing Bf 109G-14/AS in the most flight

parameters, the Wilde Sau units suffered heavy losses which were

difficult to replace.

Not only the aircraft parameters mattered. The other supporting

equipment played a role too. The anti-G pants or a new gyroscopic

gunsight K-14 gave USAAF fighter pilots further advantage. Apparently

the most important factor of the Allied air superiority became the

thorough, highly efficient new pilots‘ training. On the other side the

level of training of the young German pilots was deteriorating. The

average flight time logged by new Luftwaffe pilots was 100-120 hours

out of which only around 10 hours on the combat airplanes. That was

less than half of the flight time of their opponents whose training

was heavily focused on the combat flying. During the summer, as the

Allied attacks on the oil refineries continued, the fuel allocation to

the training units was cut down. In June 1944 the monthly fuel allocation to Luftwaffe pilot schools was 50 000 tons. In October 1944 it

was only 7000 tons. The negative impact on pilots‘ training is obvious.

In the fall the fuel was in short supply everywhere.

The combat tactics played the crucial role. The offensive deployment

of the American fighters was conducted by flying ahead of its own

formation and clearing the area of the enemy fighters, blocking the

German airports by continuously circling fighters and strafing the airports and supply lines. This tactics proved to be fatal for Luftwaffe.

eduard

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