Text: Jan Zdiarský

Illustration: Adam Tooby

Cat. No. 84195

Part of the preparations for the opening up of the Western Front in 1944 were systematic attacks against Luftwaffe transport infrastructure and airfields in northern France and the Netherlands. Supporting the nearing invasion by massive amounts of ground troops was dependent on securing air supremacy, along with crippling enemy supply routes, two factors that would be of decisive importance to the success of the entire operation. The weight of this task rested mainly on fighters and medium bombers of the RAF and USAAF.

 The most accurate tools of the trade were to be single engined fighters. Particularly suited for the task in the RAF were the Hurricane Mk.IIb or Mk.IV, which, however, had their heyday behind them, and the more modern Typhoons and Tempests from the same manufacturer.

 An invasion of the European mainland coast was almost imminent when, on the morning of May 28th, 1944, a combat reconnaissance conducted by RAF Spitfires discovered a large number of Luftwaffe single and twin-engined aircraft at airfields near Paris. On the same day, nine Tempests from No.3 Squadron RAF, subordinate to No.150 Wing and under the command of W/Cdr Roland P. Beamont himself, D.S.O, DFC & Bar headed for France. Before the group crossed the Channel, the pilots of four Tempests had to turn around for an early return due to various issues. The remaining five crossed the coast at 8,000 feet at Ault and headed straight for Cormeilles-En-Vexin airfield northwest of Paris. The tight formation of Tempests arrived at the base around 5:30 p.m., and from an area of unlimited visibility, they dove into smoke, which reduced visibility to 5-6 miles from the ground up to 5,000 feet. Nevertheless, the Tempest pilots spotted five twin-engine bombers on the southern perimeter of the airfield, which they identified as Ju 88s or Ju 188s. W/Cdr Beamont led his group in a descending turn so that they got the thin fog breaking through the sun behind them and attacked at low altitude and high speed. Roland Beamont chose a single, darkly camouflaged twin engined target, positioned between blast shelter walls. The bomber was almost head-on from the approaching Tempest, and at 470 miles per hour, destruction was only a matter of seconds. Beamont opened fire from less than 2,500 feet: ‘„…a short ranging burst and then hard down on the trigger, ruddering correction as necessary, as the blast pen erupted in strikes, with bursts all over the bomber and a large piece of it flying in the air as I snatched at the stick at the last moment to avoid flying headlong into the target.’.

 The five made only one pass over the strip. To turn around would be to attract the attention of defensive flak. Thanks to the tactical advantage of smoke reducing visibility, launching the attack from the sun, high speed and, above all, the nerves of steel of W/Cdr Beamont and his boys, they escaped unscathed. Add to that the fact that they practically nailed their Tempests almost into the ground. Inaccurate light flak was only noted as the group crossed the runway. The British airmen stuck to the ground for another two or three miles beyond the airfield before beginning to climb. Behind them they saw two prominent columns of smoke. Each of them came to their own. W/Cdr Beamont was credited with one Ju 88 destroyed, the remaining three airmen shared another Junkers destroyed and two damaged. After another thirty-five minutes, the members of this informal multinational squadron (three British, one Australian and one Polish) landed at their home field.

 Because aircraft lost in ground attacks usually did not make into Luftwaffe reports accessible today, it is difficult to determine the identity of the destroyed aircraft. There was most likely a Ju 88 S, and possibly a Ju 88 D from 6.(F)/123 (reconnaissance unit Aufklärungsgruppe 123). A Ju 188 F from 13.(F)/122 cannot be ruled out either.

 W/ Cdr. Roland Beamont scored six aerial victories, and another shared, one probable and two enemy aircraft damaged. In addition, a number of targets were destroyed on the ground and, above all, an incredible 32 destroyed V-1s. On October 12th, 1944, during an attack on the Rheine airfield, he was shot down himself and taken prisoner. After the war, he worked, among other things, as Chief Test Pilot for English Electric and in the position of Director of Flying Operations at BAC.

(I would like to thank Jan Bobek, Matti Salonen and Michal Krechowski for help with sources for this story)