Text: Jan Bobek

Illustration by Petr Štěpánek

Cat. No. 7083

The German Navy found itself in a very disadvantageous situation in the second half of the 1941. The battleships Scharnhost and Gneisenau and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen were anchored in Brest thus becoming the target of repeated RAF raids. The Germans did not want to risk the ships sailing around the west coast of Great Britain and Ireland on way to their home ports in Northern Europe, because there they could not provide air cover. There was the option of sailing through the Channel, but to some of the German Navy leadership such an idea seemed too risky. The last time a group of large warships had operated so close to British shores was in 1588, it was the Spanish Armada.  

The Channel option prevailed under code name Cerberus. The action was to be carried out in poor weather to make it more difficult for the British to threaten the ships. The Germans began to clear mines in the route and started jamming of radio communication and radars.

The British knew of the impending evacuation thanks to the ULTRA intercepts. They also had information about the mine clearance. In early February 1942, they expected German ships to sail north any day. And so, they tried to place new naval mines along the anticipated route.

On the Luftwaffe side, the then General der Jagdlflieger, the legendary Oberst Adolf Galland, was given the task to organize air cover for the ships. He was also the author of its cover name for this air operation – Donnerkeil (Thunderbolt). He had 252 fighter aircraft at his disposal. The bulk of these were Bf 109s and Fw 190s from JG 1, JG 2 and JG 26. He was also given the operational part of the training unit Jagdfliegerschule 5 as well as Bf 110 night fighters from NJG 1 and NJG 3. Bombers from KG 2 also took part. The commanders of these units learned of the plan the day before, on 11 February 1942. In the evening, Brest was bombed by RAF planes and the task force did not set sail until 22:45. Coincidentally, neither British submarines nor patrolling radar aircraft picked it up. Scharnhost, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen set off accompanied by six destroyers, which were joined by other vessels, mostly torpedo boats, during the following day.

Galland led fighter operations from the headquarters of his former unit JG 26 in Audembert. Directly on board Scharnhorst was fighter pilot Oberst Max Ibel, former Kommodore of JG 27. He commanded fighter units within Luftflotte 3 (Jafü 3). But within this operation he served as Jafü Schiff and was tasked with coordinating with the fighter units. He took direct command at the end of the air battle.

During the night of 11-12 February, night fighter aircraft carried out routine activities which were not intended to draw attention to the ships. The first fighter escorts appeared over the task force at 08:50 (German time) near Cherbourg. Coincidentally, these were Bf 110 night fighters. They were involved mainly because of their experience of flying in poor weather conditions. Formations of fighters, numbering between ten and sixteen machines, were gradually launched over the task force during the day. Worse weather prevailed on the British side of the Channel, but some German fighters took off with visibility of 100 meters.

The British became suspicious at 11:00 (German time), and on radar they spotted a group of circling aircraft moving at about 20 to 25 knots. Two pairs of Spitfires independently detected the ships around 11:30. One of them broke radio silence and reported the vessels, which at the same time prepared the Germans for an air attack.

At a 13:15, the Germans came under inaccurate fire from the Dover batteries, which were firing in bad weather according to information from radar operators. Fifteen minutes later, six valiant Swordfish crews tried to release torpedoes, but all were shot down. The British lost a total of 42 aircraft out of 450 deployed in the afternoon attacks, and one destroyer and several escort vessels were also damaged. By nightfall the Germans had made 396 fighter sorties and 50 bomber sorties. They lost 22 machines. The only damage suffered by the escorted vessels was to Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, which ran into mines. On the RAF side, there were a number of shortcomings in communications and armament. The Germans managed to achieve a tactical victory, but it was de facto a strategic retreat in the Battle of the Atlantic.