The Non-Stop Offensive
Text: Jan Bobek
Illustration: Piotr Forkasiewicz
Cat. No. 84198
On the boxart of this Spitfire edition, Piotr Forkasiewicz captured S/Ldr James Rankin of the No. 92 Squadron RAF in battle with German opponents somewhere over France in the summer of 1941. This period of large numbers of RAF raids over occupied territory on the west coast of Europe was given the name Non-Stop Offensive.
In the winter of 1940, after the Battle of Britain, most Luftwaffe fighter units moved to Germany to rest, replenish pilots and take delivery of new machines. Many airmen anticipated that the battle would continue in the spring and eventually lead to an invasion of southern England. But Adolf Hitler's plans, as we know, headed elsewhere.
Meanwhile the RAF command decided to shift its operations over French territory during 1941. It proposed several methods of deployment. These were not just raids on naval targets (Roadstead), daily bombing missions against specific ground targets (Ramrod) or risky attacks by pairs of fighter aircraft on more or less random targets on the continent (Rhubarb).
German air raids during the Battle of Britain, designed to lure into combat and destroy fighter units of Hurricanes and Spitfires, impressed the RAF command to such an extent that it decided to adopt and modify this tactic. Instead of the tens to hundreds of bombers used by the Germans, however, the British decided to deploy only small numbers of bombers, usually six to twelve. These were mostly Blenheims, although Stirlings, for example, were also deployed into combat. Gradually the number of bombers increased to 24 in exceptional cases, and the very complicated fighter escort system had as many as 350 Spitfires and Hurricanes in several flight levels. However, these actions, called Circus, posed no real threat because of the small number of bombers and the short range of the British planes, which did not have many strategic military or industrial targets within their radius of action. Germans were often unable to distinguish them from Sweep or Rodeo actions, which were purely fighter operations over enemy territory.
By the end of June 1941, the RAF had carried out about 20 Circus missions. Thanks to their new radar stations, the Germans quickly learned to recognize the types of enemy operations and to react accordingly with their own fighter units (or even ignore them). Their new Bf 109 F-1 and F-2s represented a considerable advantage over the Hurricanes and Spitfires Mk.II. Soon the technical superiority was offset by the arrival of the Spitfire Mk.V. In the autumn, however, the first Fw 190 As appeared over the battlefield, which shifted the scales again slightly in favour of the German pilots. They were usually above their RAF opponents in time to be ready with the sun at their backs or behind the clouds. They chose their targets carefully and followed a disciplined hit-and-run tactic.
After the attack on the Soviet Union, the RAF greatly increased the number of Circus operations, hoping to tying up more German fighter units at the Channel and make the situation easier for the Soviets. However, this did not happen and the German fighter units, although numerically weaker, retained the tactical initiative. German propaganda derisively referred to the British plan as the “Nonsense Offensive”.
From the end of June 1941 to the end of the year, JG 2, JG 26 and one operational training unit lost 101 pilots and 110 aircraft in combat, with another 58 destroyed or seriously damaged in other circumstances. German fighter pilots claimed 838 RAF aircraft, with a number of other downed planes claimed by flak units. Their British opponents claimed 731 certain victories but lost 1,036 fighter aircraft and 585 were severely damaged. The RAF command, thanks to the ULTRA service, had an accurate picture of the situation, from decoded German radio dispatches describing replenishment of Luftwaffe losses.
The last mission of this type in 1941 was Circus No. 110, which on November 8, 1941, headed for the Lille area. Due to German readiness and a combination of poor weather conditions and bad decisions on the side of the RAF, eleven Spitfires and nine pilots were lost, including one Wing Commander and three Squadron Leaders. A further six Spitfires were shot down while escorting Hurricanes during a Ramrod mission to the St. Pol area. The outcome of this operation was so bad for the RAF, that these missions were cancelled, except to focus on significant ground targets.
For a more detailed study of this subject I recommend John Foreman's publications and books focusing on the history of JG 2 and JG 26.