The First Wave
Text: Jan Bobek
Illustration: Antonis Karydis
Cat. No. 8227
The Battle of the Philippine Sea, which took place on June 19 and 20, 1944, during the American landings on Saipan in the Mariana Islands, was the largest carrier engagement in history. The Japanese fleet fielded nine carriers, including the Shōkaku and Zuikaku, while the American side deployed fifteen. The Japanese also utilized naval aircraft from bases in the Marianas. Since the last carrier engagements in late 1942, the Americans had significantly improved the organization of their task forces and enhanced their defenses with radar, anti-aircraft fire and, most importantly, the early deployment of carrier-based fighter units. The new F6F Hellcat, developed with insights from testing captured Zero fighters, proved to be a deadly adversary for Japanese pilots.
As the battle unfolded on the morning of June 19, the first wave of Japanese aircraft took off before 9 a.m. from the carriers Chitose, Chiyoda, and Zuihō. This initial group consisted of eight B6N Jill bombers, sixteen A6M5 Zero Type 52 escort fighters, and forty-five A6M2 Zero Type 21 fighter-bombers. Two B5N Kate bombers led the Japanese formation toward the enemy as pathfinders. The aircraft from these three carriers were part of the newly organized Kōkūtai 653, with carrier air groups designated as Hikōkitai 331 (Chitose), Hikōkitai 332 (Chiyoda), and Hikōkitai 333 (Zuihō).
Before the launch, the mood among the airmen was optimistic, with one even remarking that retribution for Midway was imminent. Their confidence, however, was far removed from the harsh reality that awaited them.
Thanks to radar and a well-organized air defense line formed by Hellcat pilots and their controllers , the Japanese formation was intercepted long before reaching the U.S. Navy task force. Over the next thirty minutes, it became the target of relentless attacks. VF-15 was the first to engage, followed by VF-2, VF-27 - known for the shark-mouth designs on their Hellcats - and other squadrons. Controllers directed about fifty Hellcats against the attackers, and the American pilots claimed around one hundred victories. Although this number was roughly twice the actual Japanese losses, the key achievement was preventing a successful strike on the carriers.
Despite their efforts, the pilots from the first Japanese attack wave did manage to hit only the battleship USS South Dakota and only one of their nine formation leaders survived and returned from the mission.
U.S. fighter pilots were surprised to find they couldn’t catch up with the B6N Jill bombers once these had started their continuous descent approach to launch their torpedoes. They were also puzzled by the fact that a significant number of Zeros did not engage in combat and continued flying straight ahead. It became apparent that these were A6M2 fighter-bombers, whose pilots, showing strict discipline, remained focused on their mission. However, some that managed to reach the American fleet made bold attacks on enemy vessels.
Antonis Karydis’ box art depicts the moment when Ensign Gordon A. Stanley, flying a Hellcat, shoots down a fighter-bomber from the carrier Chiyoda. Stanley claimed four fighter planes destroyed and two more as probably destroyed during this engagement. On June 19, 1944, Stanley achieved the highest number of kills among VF-27 (USS Princeton) pilots.
The Japanese lost more than 600 aircraft from both carrier and land-based units during the battle, along with three aircraft carriers. The inexperience of their newly trained airmen became painfully clear. Another factor contributing to their defeat was the seniority gap: compared to the carrier engagements of 1942, many of the Japanese senior officers in 1944 were about ten years younger and lacked the same level of experience, with many having no background in air operations at all. The Achilles' heel of Japanese carriers remained their inadequate passive protection and damage control systems.
Although U.S. airstrikes on Japanese carriers caused less damage than in previous battles, American submarines compensated by sinking two of the three carriers lost, leaving the Zuikaku as the only operational fleet carrier in the Imperial Navy. Barrett Tillman vividly recounts this battle in his book Clash of the Carriers.
Following the defeat, the Japanese command began searching intensively for a way to overcome the sophisticated defences of the American task force, which was difficult to penetrate due to a combination of radar, fighter cover, and strong anti-aircraft defences. This led to the development of the kamikaze tactics.
Additionally, the U.S. occupation of Saipan paved the way for the establishment of an airbase for B-29 strategic bombers, which, thanks to this new airfield, were now within range of Japan.