POSTAVENO

HISTORY

Bout One: First Out of the Pan

and Into the Fire

The remaining six Mustangs from the training

program of South Korean pilots with freshly

applied ROKAF markings left for Korea on July

2. In their cockpits this time were six Korean

pilots. As the originally trained Korean pilots

were not ready for combat, the most experienced ones arrived from Korea and hurriedly

made themselves familiarized with Mustang

within just a couple of days. It was far from ideal, as they flew just one or two training flights

with the aircraft they have never flown before.

The ability of these pilots to reach their destination safely raised some concerns. Also their

aircraft were not in the best shape as they were

serving as a tugs for the tow targets, which

was hard duty and also their maintenance was

somehow compromised… Anyway, the things

went well and all the Mustangs ladned safely at

Taegu, completing the Bout One gathering of ten

Mustangs. Ten American pilots of the unit were

ready to fly them in combat, while sixt Korean

pilots were to be gradually trained with some

ready to get into action immediately. (5

Combat missions were initiated next day already, where first and foremost, the unit CO, Major

Hess, excelled. He tirelessly flew several missions per day. Despite having combat experience gained in the Second World War, the six

Koreans didn’t possess full control of the reigns over their Mustangs. The biggest issues for

them were caused by the aircraft’s high wing

load, which tended to extract a certain tax from

its pilots. Colonel Lee Gun Suk, experienced

wartime pilot, who is even credited with up to

23 kills in some Korean sources (although this

is unlikely), couldn’t pull out of his dive after

attacking a North Korean tank. He crashed and

was killed…

The lack of proper training of the Korean pilots

also somewhat complicated their operations.

Taegu was crowded with transport aircraft,

and the Koreans usually flew out of Chinhae

At the end of the war, by June 27, 1953,

the ROKAF would have 118 aircraft,

including 78 F-51D Mustangs and 11,500

personnel. In all, 39 Korean pilots will

have accounted for one hundred sorties,

and seventeen would be killed in combat…

Why Mustangs?

photo: U.S. Air Force

After his return to Japan, MacArthur learned

that Australian Prime Minister Robert G. Menzies offered the services of No. 77 Squadron,

which fell under FEAF. This was good news, because it meant another thirty Mustangs ready

for action and transfer to the area within a few

short days.

Contrary to the more sophisticated jet powered aircraft, Mustangs

could operate from unprepared airstrips. They were able to provide

air support at low altitudes using a wide range of munitions.

Another advantage was their long range and endurance.

The F-51D became the only single engine piston powered

fighter bomber used by the USAF in the Korean War and

fulfilled similar missions to that of the Navy or Marines Corsairs (in the F4U-4, F4U-4B, F4U-5N, F4U-5NL,

F4U-5P and AU-1 versions). Also, among the initial suggestions was the use of the F-47 Thunderbolt, but that

was never realized. There were several reasons for this,

despite the robust and high-performing “Jug” seeming

like the perfect candidate for such an operations in Korea. One reason was that throughout the entire Air Force,

there was only a single training unit still flying this type,

and there was uncertainty surrounding the ability to put

July 2022

together enough aircraft for the required service. To top

it off, there were no sources of spare parts for the Thunderbolts in Japan, contrary to the situation surrounding

the Mustang. FEAF commander General Stratemeyer

pushed stubbornly and persistently for the F-47. USAF

Chief of Staff General Hoyt Vandenberg didn’t definitely

turn down the requests until May 4, 1951, almost a year

later! The reasons that Stratemeyer so yearned for the

F-47 stems from the fact that, as was confirmed, the

Mustang was first a fighter. That was its role in the Second World War. Mustangs certainly played the part of

a strafing machine without question, but they were not

the ideal weapon for that role. The cooling system and the

length of its coolant system piping meant that the Mustang was more vulnerable to small arms ground fire. The

Thunderbolt, with its air-cooled radial, would be more

suited to the types of conditions that low level ops generated, even with its complex turbocharger. Stratemeyer’s

opinion was certainly not a case of mere theorizing. The

vulnerability of the Mustang did extract a heavy toll on

its numbers. Some monthly losses of F-51Ds amounted

to over a half of aircraft lost. As an example, April, 1951,

anti-aircraft batteries brought down thirteen F-80s, two

Thunderjets and 25 Mustangs…

INFO Eduard

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