Route 65 Across Europe
Jan Zdiarský The first operations of the US bomber forces in Europe in 1942 revealed the overlooked weakness of the strategic four-engine bombers when faced with the German Luftwaffe. Contrary to the assumptions of the leaders of the so-called "bombing mafia" in the US Army Air Force command, the reality showed the great vulnerability of the bombers, which, with the increasing deployment of aircraft and frequency of missions, soon manifested itself in the form of enormous losses.
The assumption that four-engine bombers formations would
be the unchallenged masters of the skies over the continent, eas-
ily repelling attacks by enemy ghters and ying high above the
range of German anti-aircraft guns, was soon proven wrong. The
losses were so enormous that consideration was given to halt-
ing strategic bombing missions or incorporating the USAAF‘s VIII
Bomber Command into the RAF command and focusing on night
bombing.
This was at a time when the Americans were attacking targets
in occupied France or just on the edge of the Reich itself. How-
ever, it was clear that the time would soon come when it would
be necessary to penetrate much deeper into German territory.
The only thing that could protect the bombers were their own
ghter units. The problem was that neither the Americans nor
the British had an aircraft that could fully handle such a role.
The existing P-47 and P-38 were not sucient in this regard. The
development of a suitable aircraft was the task of the design-
ers and engineers; the creation of an appropriate organizational
structure fell to the strategists and commanders. Ambitious goals
were to lead to the creation of the most powerful air force in
the world. And this was achieved in less than two years from the
moment when, on August 17, 1942, American bombers from the
8th AF undertook their rst independent operation, an attack on
the Rouen-Sotteville marshalling yard in France.
(Note: for more information, we recommend
the introductory text to the 11174 MIGHTY EIGHTH:
66th Fighter Wing kit, or the article Little Friends
in Info Eduard magazine No. 161 - 7/2023.
Although the USAAF already had its own ghter units in the
United Kingdom, but these needed to be logistically and func-
tionally linked to the bomber units. In February 1944, the US
Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USSTAF) were formed, and the
8th Air Force was reorganized on the basis of VIII Bomber Com-
mand, incorporating VIII Air Support Command and VIII Fighter
Command in addition to Bomber Command itself. The latter
structure consisted of three ghter wings, whose primary task
was to protect the bombers. Initially, the VIII FC did not have as
many aircraft and personnel as it needed. However, these were
soon replenished, and by August 1944, the 8th AF had sixteen
ghter groups at its disposal. These were incorporated into three
ghter wings, namely the 65th Fighter Wing (FW), 66th FW, and
67th FW. With a few exceptions, the aliation of specic ghter
groups to a given wing remained stable. At the same time, these
wings usually provided escort to Big Brothers of specic Bomber
Divisions from the 8th AF (the 65th FW escorted Liberators from
the 2nd BD, the 66th FW escorted B-17s from the 3rd BD, and the
67th FW escorted B-17s from the 1st BD).
65th Fighter Wing
The 65th Fighter Wing (65th FW) was established on March
25, 1943, as the 4th Air Defense Wing. Its headquarters moved
to England in late spring 1943, where it was redesignated the
65th Fighter Wing a month later. Its primary tasks were to escort
bombers of the 2nd Bomb Division (later the 2nd Air Division),
but also to attack ground targets during preparations for the in-
vasion in June 1944 and subsequently to provide direct support
to ground forces or to attack transport targets and airelds deep
inside the continent.
While the ghter groups of the 65th FW did not have as many
top aces as other units, there were still some notable names
emerged, including Col. Hubert A. Zemke, LtCol. Francis S. Gabre-
The rst operations of the US bomber forces in Europe in 1942 revealed the overlooked weakness
of the strategic four-engine bombers when faced with the German Luftwae. Contrary to the assump-
tions of the leaders of the so-called „bombing maa“ in the US Army Air Force command, the reality
showed the great vulnerability of the bombers, which, with the increasing deployment of aircraft and
frequency of missions, soon manifested itself in the form of enormous losses.
Title photo: A two ights formation of Mustangs from the 375th and 376th FS, assigned to the 361st Fighter Group.
HISTORY
INFO Eduard
7
April 2026