Höhengruppe
Text: Jan Bobek
Illustration: Adam Tooby
Cat. No. 84169
When III./JG 1 was newly established in Leeuwarden, the Netherlands, in April 1943, it did not have an easy start. Some airmen had been transferred from other parts of JG 1. However, the Stab and one full Staffel of III./JG 1 were created from scratch. The unit was armed with Bf 109 Gs. The first commander was Maj. Karl-Heinz Leesmann (37 victories, Knight's Cross), who, for health reasons, had not participated in combat flights in the past months and had led his previous unit on the Eastern Front "from the ground." A good part of the new members of III./JG 1 came directly from training units. The unit therefore had to devote itself to intensive training in combat operations in June and July. At the same time, though it began to be deployed in combat against four-engine bombers. In one engagement with the Americans, on July 25, 1943, Maj. Leesmann was killed.
The next CO was Hptm. Robert Olejnik, who had previously led 4./JG 1 within II./JG 1 (formerly I./JG 3). He achieved his 40th victory on August 17, 1943, during the defense against air raids on Regensburg and Schweinfurt, when he shot down a B-17. Yet, III./JG 1 was one of several units to receive harsh criticism from other Jagdgeschwader commanders for their poor performance that day.
Under a new CO, Hptm. Friedrich Eberle, III./JG 1 became in November the so-called "leichte Gruppe," or light fighter group. Their task was to attack the fighter escorts of American bombers, making it easier for their colleagues in I. and II./JG 1, armed with Focke-Wulf Fw 190 A aircraft, to engage the bomber formations.
The increasing range and effectiveness of American fighter escorts posed a serious problem for German airmen. Thus the Berlin command hesitated for a long time on how to deal with the escorts. Göring and his staff wanted to concentrate the fighter units as much as possible on attacking the bombers but refused to concentrate their forces in one area. The political directive was clear: some fighter units were to remain in every part of the Reich to maintain the population's morale.
In late February 1944, it was finally decided that one dedicated Jagdgruppe would be assigned to each fighter division (Jagddivision) within I. Jagdkorps to combat American fighters at high altitude. These were I./JG 3 (within Jagddivision 1), II./JG 11 (JD 2), and III./JG 1 (JD 3). These units were named "Höhengruppen" and were armed with Messerschmitt Bf 109 G-5 and G-6 aircraft equipped with the GM-1 system. From April onwards, priority was given to upgraded Bf 109 G-6/AS machines with DB 605 AS engines.
Accomplishing this task in the first half of 1944 was extremely difficult. The German pilots faced experienced opponents whose aircraft outperformed even the modified Bf 109s. Occasionally, German formations became targets of their own flak. Enemies also radioed false orders in German, which were sometimes hard to distinguish from their own command's instructions.
Among the ranks of III./JG 1 at that time were experienced airmen such as Hptm. Lutz-Wilhelm Burkhardt (58 v., KC), Hptm. Alfred Grislawski (133 v., KC with Oak Leaves), and Obfw. Herbert Kaiser (68 v., KC). However, the veterans left no room for the motivated newcomers' illusions. Upon arrival at III./JG 1, surprised young airmen learned, "If you see him (the American) on the right, bail out. If you see him on the left, bail out." Moreover, aerial combat had reached a brutal phase, and German airmen on parachute became targets for American fighters both in the air and on the ground.
In the first five months of 1944, III./JG 1 achieved 26 victories, mostly against fighter escorts. However, enemy action resulted in the loss of 84 aircraft, and nearly 70 of its airmen were killed or wounded. Its airbase was repeatedly targeted by heavy bomber raids. The commander of III./JG 1, Hptm. Eberle, was sent to a rear ground unit in late April 1944 and was replaced by Maj. Hartmann Grasser (103 v., KC with Oak Leaves). Just before the start of the invasion, Grasser was appointed to head the operational training unit II./JG 110, which probably saved his life.
In the first half of June, III./JG 1 ceased its role as Höhengruppe and underwent a short deployment in Normandy. It returned to this battlefield after a few weeks and, during July and August, lost 56 aircraft and 53 airmen who were wounded, killed, captured, or missing. In the first eight months of 1944, III./JG 1 thus lost approximately three times its aircrew number. The Luftwaffe no longer had a chance to win the war over Western Europe.