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BOXART STORY #84198
On the boxart of this Spitfire edition, Piotr
Forkasiewicz captured S/Ldr James Rankin of
the No. 92 Squadron RAF in battle with German
opponents somewhere over France in the
summer of 1941. This period of large numbers
of RAF raids over occupied territory on the west
coast of Europe was given the name Non-Stop
Offensive.
In the winter of 1940, after the Battle of
Britain, most Luftwaffe fighter units moved
to Germany to rest, replenish pilots and
take delivery of new machines. Many airmen
anticipated that the battle would continue in
the spring and eventually lead to an invasion
of southern England. But Adolf Hitler's plans,
as we know, headed elsewhere.
Meanwhile the RAF command decided to shift
its operations over French territory during 1941.
It proposed several methods of deployment.
These were not just raids on naval targets
(Roadstead), daily bombing missions against
specific ground targets (Ramrod) or risky
attacks by pairs of fighter aircraft on more or
less random targets on the continent (Rhubarb).
German air raids during the Battle of Britain,
designed to lure into combat and destroy fighter
units of Hurricanes and Spitfires, impressed
the RAF command to such an extent that it
decided to adopt and modify this tactic. Instead
of the tens to hundreds of bombers used by
the Germans, however, the British decided to
deploy only small numbers of bombers, usually
six to twelve. These were mostly Blenheims,
although Stirlings, for example, were also
deployed into combat. Gradually the number of
bombers increased to 24 in exceptional cases,
and the very complicated fighter escort system
had as many as 350 Spitfires and Hurricanes
in several flight levels. However, these actions,
called Circus, posed no real threat because of
the small number of bombers and the short
range of the British planes, which did not have
many strategic military or industrial targets
within their radius of action. Germans were
often unable to distinguish them from Sweep
or Rodeo actions, which were purely fighter
operations over enemy territory.
By the end of June 1941, the RAF had carried
out about 20 Circus missions. Thanks to their
new radar stations, the Germans quickly learned
to recognize the types of enemy operations and
to react accordingly with their own fighter units
(or even ignore them). Their new Bf 109 F-1 and
F-2s represented a considerable advantage
over the Hurricanes and Spitfires Mk.II. Soon the
technical superiority was offset by the arrival
of the Spitfire Mk.V. In the autumn, however, the
first Fw 190 As appeared over the battlefield,
which shifted the scales again slightly in favour
of the German pilots. They were usually above
their RAF opponents in time to be ready with
the sun at their backs or behind the clouds.
They chose their targets carefully and followed
a disciplined hit-and-run tactic.
After the attack on the Soviet Union, the
RAF greatly increased the number of Circus
operations, hoping to tying up more German
fighter units at the Channel and make the
situation easier for the Soviets. However,
this did not happen and the German fighter
units, although numerically weaker, retained
the tactical initiative. German propaganda
derisively referred to the British plan as the
“Nonsense Offensive”.
From the end of June 1941 to the end of the
year, JG 2, JG 26 and one operational training
unit lost 101 pilots and 110 aircraft in combat,
with another 58 destroyed or seriously damaged
in other circumstances. German fighter pilots
claimed 838 RAF aircraft, with a number of
other downed planes claimed by flak units.
Their British opponents claimed 731 certain
victories but lost 1,036 fighter aircraft and 585
were severely damaged. The RAF command,
thanks to the ULTRA service, had an accurate
picture of the situation, from decoded German
radio dispatches describing replenishment of
Luftwaffe losses.
The last mission of this type in 1941 was Circus
No. 110, which on November 8, 1941, headed for
the Lille area. Due to German readiness and
a combination of poor weather conditions and
bad decisions on the side of the RAF, eleven
Spitfires and nine pilots were lost, including
one Wing Commander and three Squadron
Leaders. A further six Spitfires were shot down
while escorting Hurricanes during a Ramrod
mission to the St. Pol area. The outcome of this
operation was so bad for the RAF, that these
missions were cancelled, except to focus on
significant ground targets.
For a more detailed study of this subject
I recommend John Foreman's publications and
books focusing on the history of JG 2 and JG 26.
Illustration: Piotr Forkasiewicz
The Non-Stop Offensive
Text: Jan Bobek
INFO Eduard38
February 2024