BOXART STORY
#82115
The First Winter
When Adolf Hitler broke the MolotovRibbentrop Treaty and attacked Stalin’s
Soviet Union with his allies on June 22, 1941,
the greatest ground and air battles in world
history took place. However, the forces of
Germany and its satellites launched the
attack later than originally planned. And
the command's ideas that the Soviets would
be defeated by winter were wrong for many
reasons. In addition, the Soviet Union soon
began to receive help under the Lend-Lease
Act. Coming winter 1941/1942 German ground
and air units were in a situation for which
they were often ill-equipped, unlike their
opponents who knew the terrain and the
Russian winter well.
One of the units that fought in Russia at
that time was Jagdgeschwader 54 “Grünherz”
under the command of Kommodore Hannes
Trautloft. One of his Gruppen, I./JG 54, was
commanded from February 1942 by Hptm.
Hans Philipp, whose duel is depicted on
a boxart by Adam Tooby. Trautloft ordered
preparation of report relating Geschwader
experiences from November 1, 1941, to April
30, 1942. It is available in the Bundesarchiv
under the signature RL 10/477. The document
is 80 pages long and in a few paragraphs,
I will try to summarize some interesting
points from the first seven chapters.
JG 54 was deployed on a frontline
stretching 330 km long in the Army Group
Nord area between Lake Ilmen and Leningrad.
It was subordinated to Luftflotte 1 within the
I. Fliegerkorps. Its armament consisted of
July 2023
Bf 109 F-2s and the first F-4s were received
by III. Gruppe in March 1942. In December the
temperature dropped to minus 10´C, but by
January it reached minus 42°C. During this
period, JG 54 flew 8,946 combat sorties and
1,258 ground attack sorties. In doing so, it
claimed the shoot-down of 51 reconnaissance,
courier and transport aircraft types, 107
bombers, most of which were modern Pe-2
and Il-2s, and destroyed 518 fighter aircraft,
more than 80% of which were modern aircraft.
During the winter the Soviet airmen
modified their formations in a manner similar
to that used by the Germans. Due to the
technical superiority of the Bf 109 F, their
enemies began to use a defensive circle
against which the Germans had to develop
offensive tactics. On this battlefield JG 54
encountered for the first time the Curtiss
P-40s, which they judged to have good rate of
climb and ability to manoeuvre in turns.
The Soviet formations usually flew
machines with white camouflage paint as well
as the original dark camouflage, which made it
difficult for the Germans to get an overview of
the number and position of their enemies. The
Bf 109 F usually used a four-plane formation
(Schwarm), which was split into a pair (Rotte)
that attacked and a second Rotte that provided
cover. The recommended method of attack
was at close range from the rear, due to the
quality of the armour of the Soviet machines.
When the firing ceased, it was recommended
to pull in and fly over the enemy so that the
German machine would not be hit by debris.
Text: Jan Bobek
Illustration: Adam Tooby
Soviet bomber formations usually flew in
numbers of three to twelve machines with
a strong fighter escort. Against such superior
numbers, it was necessary to call in additional
Rotten and Schwärme from other sections of
the front in order to draw the fighter escorts
into the fight and then attack the bombers.
The Pe-2 formations were very disciplined
and it was not recommended to attack them
directly from the rear. If a bomber was hit, the
other Pe-2 crews would try to line it up in the
centre of the formation to protect it.
According to the JG 54 pilots, the Il-2s had
excellent armour and it was recommended to
fire at the tail surfaces, ideally from above or
from the side. The JG 54 report shows respect
for the rear gunners of enemy bombers.
Mention is also made of the problem of
retraining rookie pilots, who had a great
appetite for combat but at the same time
underestimated the enemy.
Escorting German bombers was more
difficult than in the summer of 1941, mainly
because of the timing of rendezvous and also
because Ju 88 crews tended to use looser
formations. JG 54 rated better the Stukas
crews, who maintained tight formations in
a disciplined manner.
JG 54 judged the enemy anti-aircraft
defences to be highly effective, these were
particularly dangerous during strafing
attacks. It was not recommended to attack a
single target twice, and it was essential to fly
low when departing.
INFO Eduard
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