THE OIL CAMPAIGN
Both the Eighth Air Force and RAF Bomber Command were averse (to put it mildly) to “outsiders” trying to convince them to change their strategic target priorities in search of “the magic spot” that would cause the downfall of Germany.
Adapted from: “Clean Sweep: VIII Fighter
Command Against the Luftwaffe - 1942-45"
Thomas McKelvey Cleaver
HISTORY
THE OIL CAMPAIGN
Both the Eighth Air Force and RAF Bomber Command were averse (to put it mildly)
to “outsiders” trying to convince them to change their strategic target priorities
in search of “the magic spot” that would cause the downfall of Germany
Germany and her allies had nowhere near
the access to oil supplies that the Allies did.
The Germans had been forced to create
a synthetic oil industry in the 1930s in anticipation
of going to war, and the Nazis considered their
alliance with Romania to be their major diplomatic
coup, since it gave them access to and control of
the oilfields around Ploesti, the only source of oil
in Europe. Ploesti’s oilfields were the source of
30 percent of the Axis oil supply. The major thrust
of the assault on the Soviet Union had been on
the southern front, where anticipated success
at Stalingrad would have allowed access to the
oilfields of Baku.
The Allies had long been aware of the Nazi
Achilles’ Heel. One of the first missions flown by
American heavy bombers had been the abortive
attempt by the HALPRO force, the first B-24s
assigned to the Ninth Air Force in 1942, to bomb
Ploesti. The force had not been strong enough to
inflict any lasting damage. With the Axis forces
driven from North Africa after may 1943, Ploesti
again became a target with Operation Tidal Wave,
flown on August 1, 1943. In the wake of that
unsuccessful mission, the Fifteenth Air Force
was created in Italy specifically to mount a major,
sustained campaign to destroy Ploesti.
General Spaatz’s USSTAF planners estimated
they could drop German gasoline production
50 percent with 15 missions against Ploesti by
the Fifteenth Air Force and 10 against the German
synthetic oil industry by the Eighth. Ploesti and
the German synthetic oil industry was the only
lifeline the Wehrmacht had to maintaining the
ability to fight a mechanized war. British planners
in the Ministry of Economic Warfare had long
pleaded to no avail with Bomber Command’s Sir
Athur Harris to attack these targets, with Harris
dismissing such a plan as a “panacea” that would
divert him from his campaign to destroy German
cities.
Spaatz argued to Eisenhower before SHAEF
took control of the Eighth that destroying the
panzer’s gasoline supply was a far greater
blow against the enemy than destroying easily-
repaired railroad marshaling yards. Knowing
he could not get SHAEF’s focus away from the
Transportation plan, Spaatz pointed out that an
aerial offensive against oil would only need half
of Eighth Air Force’s bombers, the rest could be
employed against the rail system. Unfortunately,
the Air Force’s history of over-promising on the
decisive results of striking “strategic” targets
and the failure of the ball bearing campaign the
previous fall, worked against Spaatz, even with
the full support of General Arnold in Washington.
Churchill, who was concerned that killing
large numbers of French and Belgian civilians
living near the rail yards would create political
problems both during the war and in its
aftermath, favored the Oil Campaign. However,
in a meeting at SHAEF HQ on March 25, 1944,
Eisenhower pressed VIII Bomber Command’s
General Frederick Anderson about the likelihood
of success of a campaign against synthetic oil,
with Anderson forced to confess that the Air
Force “could not guarantee that the attacks of oil
targets would have an appreciable effect during
the initial stages of Overlord.” Anderson did say
that a campaign against the synthetic oil industry
“would have a decisive effect within a period
of about six months.” Since he was concerned
about the immediate problems associated with
putting an army into France and keeping it there,
Eisenhower came down against the proposal.
RAF Chief of Staff Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal
found a compromise with the proposal that such
a campaign would be mounted by both Eighth
Air Force and Bomber Command once the Allied
armies were firmly in Normandy and any German
counterattack had been blunted.
Since the Fifteenth was not involved in the
invasion, Spaatz was able to convince Tedder
to allow him to mount a mission against Ploesti
shortly after Eisenhower’s decision. The results
were so good that Tedder allowed the Fifteenth
to make repeated attacks between early April
and late June 1944, which saw the Romanian oil
fields and refineries severely damaged and oil
production severely curtailed. The Axis would
The blue noses of the 352nd "Blue-Nosed Bastards of Bodney came in several shades of blue until
the marking was standardized using RAF Dark Mediterranean Blue. (USAF Official)
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July 2024