THE OIL CAMPAIGN
Adapted from: “Clean Sweep: VIII Fighter Command Against the Luftwaffe - 1942-45"
By: Thomas McKelvey Cleaver
Both the Eighth Air Force and RAF Bomber Command were averse (to put it mildly) to “outsiders” trying to convince them to change their strategic target priorities in search of “the magic spot” that would cause the downfall of Germany.
Germany and her allies had nowhere near the access to oil supplies that the Allies did. The Germans had been forced to create a synthetic oil industry in the 1930s in anticipation of going to war, and the Nazis considered their alliance with Romania to be their major diplomatic coup, since it gave them access to and control of the oilfields around Ploesti, the only source of oil in Europe. Ploesti’s oilfields were the source of 30 percent of the Axis oil supply. The major thrust of the assault on the Soviet Union had been on the southern front, where anticipated success at Stalingrad would have allowed access to the oilfields of Baku.
The Allies had long been aware of the Nazi Achilles’ Heel. One of the first missions flown by American heavy bombers had been the abortive attempt by the HALPRO force, the first B-24s assigned to the Ninth Air Force in 1942, to bomb Ploesti. The force had not been strong enough to inflict any lasting damage. With the Axis forces driven from North Africa after may 1943, Ploesti again became a target with Operation Tidal Wave, flown on August 1, 1943. In the wake of that unsuccessful mission, the Fifteenth Air Force was created in Italy specifically to mount a major, sustained campaign to destroy Ploesti.
General Spaatz’s USSTAF planners estimated they could drop German gasoline production 50 percent with 15 missions against Ploesti by the Fifteenth Air Force and 10 against the German synthetic oil industry by the Eighth. Ploesti and the German synthetic oil industry was the only lifeline the Wehrmacht had to maintaining the ability to fight a mechanized war. British planners in the Ministry of Economic Warfare had long pleaded to no avail with Bomber Command’s Sir Athur Harris to attack these targets, with Harris dismissing such a plan as a “panacea” that would divert him from his campaign to destroy German cities.
Spaatz argued to Eisenhower before SHAEF took control of the Eighth that destroying the panzer’s gasoline supply was a far greater blow against the enemy than destroying easily-repaired railroad marshaling yards. Knowing he could not get SHAEF’s focus away from the Transportation plan, Spaatz pointed out that an aerial offensive against oil would only need half of Eighth Air Force’s bombers, the rest could be employed against the rail system. Unfortunately, the Air Force’s history of over-promising on the decisive results of striking “strategic” targets and the failure of the ball bearing campaign the previous fall, worked against Spaatz, even with the full support of General Arnold in Washington.
The blue noses of the 352nd "Blue-Nosed Bastards of Bodney came in several shades of blue until the marking was standardized using RAF Dark Mediterranean Blue. (USAF Official)
Churchill, who was concerned that killing large numbers of French and Belgian civilians living near the rail yards would create political problems both during the war and in its aftermath, favored the Oil Campaign. However, in a meeting at SHAEF HQ on March 25, 1944, Eisenhower pressed VIII Bomber Command’s General Frederick Anderson about the likelihood of success of a campaign against synthetic oil, with Anderson forced to confess that the Air Force “could not guarantee that the attacks of oil targets would have an appreciable effect during the initial stages of Overlord.” Anderson did say that a campaign against the synthetic oil industry “would have a decisive effect within a period of about six months.” Since he was concerned about the immediate problems associated with putting an army into France and keeping it there, Eisenhower came down against the proposal. RAF Chief of Staff Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal found a compromise with the proposal that such a campaign would be mounted by both Eighth Air Force and Bomber Command once the Allied armies were firmly in Normandy and any German counterattack had been blunted.
Since the Fifteenth was not involved in the invasion, Spaatz was able to convince Tedder to allow him to mount a mission against Ploesti shortly after Eisenhower’s decision. The results were so good that Tedder allowed the Fifteenth to make repeated attacks between early April and late June 1944, which saw the Romanian oil fields and refineries severely damaged and oil production severely curtailed. The Axis would lose all access to Romanian oil at the end of August 1944, when the country surrendered in the face of Soviet invasion.
The Fifteenth’s four fighter groups that re-equipped with the P-51 between March and June 1944 - the 31st, 52nd, 322nd and 325th - racked up impressive scores against both the Romanian Air Force and the Luftwaffe on these missions. Herschel Green, the 325th group’s leading ace, who was a veteran of the North African, Sicilian and Italian campaigns, later recalled that the air battles over Romania were “the most intense combat I experienced in my tour.” Ploesti was so important that two Luftwaffe Gruppen - including Erich Hartmann’s II/JG 52 - were withdrawn from the Eastern Front to reinforce the Ploesti defenses.
With the Ploesti campaign’s demonstrated success, Spaatz once again asked Eisenhower for permission to bomb the synthetic oil refineries. When Eisenhower told him to wait till the end of summer, an argument broke out between the two that was so intense it was rumored Spaatz had threatened to resign. Eisenhower relented by authorizing the Eighth to attack on two days in May when weather over France prevented bombing of rail targets.
The first mission was flown on May 12, 886 bombers were sent to bomb a complex of synthetic oil plants in central and eastern Germany and met significant aerial opposition.
The 352nd Fighter Group’s John C. Meyer almost became someone else’s score in a battle over the synthetic oil plant at Prenzlau. Meyer spotted a combat wing of Fortresses rocked by explosions and took two 487th squadron flights to investigate, closer, Meyer saw several parachutes in the air, then spotted three gaggles of enemy aircraft. He quickly lost the first two he spotted in the heavy haze, but one Bf 109 from the third flight failed to reach the sanctuary of the haze and Meyer set it on fire with one burst. After watching it crash, he spotted an airfield with bombers on it and made a run in which he destroyed a He 177. As he pulled up, a Bf 109 bounced him and he only managed to escape with a series of violent maneuvers taken at a low enough altitude he thought for a moment he might crash. Meyer was able to return to Bodney to complete the last mission of his first tour of duty, with claims that raised his score to 15.5, including 8.5 aerial victories.
The Eighth lost 46 bombers on the May 12 missions. However, the aerial battles had been one of the worst days for the Jagdwaffe, which reported losing 61 fighters. Albert Speer wrote of the strike in his memoirs, stating, “On that day, the technological war was decided.” Speer authorized top priority to repairing the synthetic oil refineries and crews worked 24 hours a day to restore production.
On May 28 and 29, the Eighth’s bombers returned to hit the newly-repaired facilities while the Fifteenth hit Ploesti with its biggest attacks. ULTRA intercepts in June confirmed that gasoline production had been cut in half. Following these attacks, Speer told Hitler that if the enemy persisted in these attacks over the summer, Germany would have no way to prosecute the war by fall.
The legendary Chuck Yeager on the wing of his second P-15, P-51D "Glamourus Glen II" in which he shot down an Me 262 in November 1944.
With the invasion a week away, a larger campaign would have to await victory in Normandy. Strategic bombing had finally found the target that would change the war.
By mid-June, the Allies were firmly ashore in Normandy. General Spaatz renewed his request that the Eighth be allowed to resume attacks on the synthetic oil industry. Eisenhower had him written permission to divert the bombers from direct support of the invasion on days when there was good weather over Germany and were no missions against “Crossbow sites” (the German V-1 launch sites) or infantry support.
The synthetic oil plants were located near coal deposits in the Ruhr, Silesia, south of Berlin and Leipzig. These plants produced 75 percent of Germany’s total fuel supplies: 85 percent of high-grade diesel and gasoline, and all aviation gasoline.
Nearly one-third of this production was concentrated in the massive Leuna plant outside Merseburg and Politz, 70 miles northeast of Berlin. Five other plants located in central Germany produced another third.
The Leuna plant’s 250 buildings covered three square miles and employed 35,000 workers, 10,000 of them slave laborers or POWs. A facility that size should have been easy to hit with precision bombing, but the German defenses involved greasy black smoke sent up from hundreds of small ovens that ruined visibility. Additionally, decoy buildings that were constructed outside the plant were bombed as much as the plant itself. The plant was protected by 600 radar-supported 88mm anti-aircraft cannons, while several Luftwaffe fighter units were based nearby.
Merseburg became known as “Mercilessburg” to the bomber crews. Second Lieutenant Tom Landry, who would become head coach of the Dallas Cowboys, flew most of his missions in the oil campaign, he remembered that the sky over the city and the plant was filled by “an angry black cloud of exploding flak.”
The B-17s and B-24s primarily dropped 250-pound bombs, these were not strong enough to destroy the reinforced concrete blast walls protecting the storage tanks, compressors and other machinery. These lighter bombs also made German firefighting easier because the fires were less intense and long-lasting as compared to the destructive effect of the RAF 4,000-pound “cookies,” that were responsible for most of the damage.
The summer of 1944 saw poor weather, which prevented the bombers returning to a target quickly. The Germans were able to get plants back into production at lowered rates within four to six weeks. Toward the end of the campaign, air force planners using increased photo reconnaissance were able to time attacks to coincide with production resumption.
Captain Pierce McKennon was one of the longest-serving pilots in the 4th FG, arriving in 1943 and flying operations to the end of the war. (USAF official)
The first attack of the Oil Campaign was against the huge plant at Politz on June 20, 1944. The Fourth Fighter Group provided Target Withdrawal Support. Fifty ZG 76 Me 410s intercepted the bombers, some carrying massive 50mm anti-tank cannons, escorted by Bf 109s. The Luftwaffe admitted the loss of 12 Me 410s to the Debden Eagles and other groups.
The mission saw the loss of Jim Goodson, who led his 336th squadron in his brand-new P-51D. Spotting airplanes on the airfield at Neubrandenburg on the way home, Goodson led the squadron in a low-level attack. As he picked out a Do 217 on the field, his Mustang took a hit in the vulnerable radiator. With engine temperature soaring, Goodson crash-landed on the airfield and was quickly captured. Since the Mustang looked undamaged from the air, other squadron members strafed it as Goodson and his captors threw themselves on the ground. At the time of his loss, Goodson was VIII fighter Command’s leading ace, with 14 aerial victories and 15.5 ground kills, he would remain top ace of the Fourth.
The Eighth’s first “Operation Frantic” shuttle mission was flown June 21. Among the others, First Bomb Division contributed 163 B-17s, their escort to the target was performed by 72 P-38s of the 364th and 55th groups, and 38 P-47s of the 353rd group. The Fourth, flying three 16-plane squadrons, reinforced by 16 P-51s from the 352nd’s 486th squadron, were led by Don Blakeslee. They rendezvoused with the bombers before they hit the target and flew with them to Poltava in Ukraine, a flight of 1,600 miles.
Shortly after the Eagles picked up the bombers over Lezno, Poland, 30 Bf 109s attacked the bombers over Siedlice. Captain Frank Jones and 1st Lt Joseph Lang each got one, making both aces. The 335th squadron’s 1st Lt Frank Sibbett was shot down and killed. Blakeslee navigated the flight - as he was later proud to recall - with four maps and a wrist watch, bringing the group to Poltava where they landed at 1450 hours, his exact ETA, he considered leading the flight across Europe his greatest achievement of his wartime career. Ralph Hofer, who wandered off on his own again, was unable to rejoin the group and got lost. He landed unexpectedly at Kiev, where he was closely interrogated by the Russians before they let him fly over to Poltava the next day.
Unknown to the Americans, the force had been shadowed by a Ju 88 after the formation broke away from the main force and headed east. That night, the Luftwaffe staged one of their last large-scale bombing missions. The Poltava airfield was hit, destroying many B-17s - half of those on the field.
With the majority of the Jagdwaffe in Normandy, missions over Germany did not find larger air opposition until July 18. The 352nd was escorting bombers to targets in Peenemünde and Zinnowitz when they encountered a mixed force of about 40 Me 410s and Ju 88s, with a top cover of 20 Bf 109s that were stalking the bombers. Outnumbered, the 486th and 487th squadrons attacked, quickly dispersing them while the Bf 109 cover was engaged by the 328th squadron.
George Preddy, whose run of victories had taken off in late June when he exchanged his P-51B “Cripes A’Mighty II” for one of the newer P-51Ds, which he named “Cripes A’Mighty III”, claimed two Ju 88s destroyed, a third as a probable, and two more “damaged.” along with a Bf 109 destroyed. With that, his score of aerial victories rose to 14.5 and he was recognized as the group’s leading ace.
On July 19, the Fourth ran across Bf 109s over Munich. The 336th’s Lieutenants Ira Grounds and Francis Grove got two and one, respectively. First Lieutenant Curtis Simpson, whose P-51B lost its glycol after being damaged during the fight later recalled, “This particular escort flight was the sixth straight flight that we had made to Munich in six days, but it was the first one where there was any opposition. We were jumped by a group of ‘109s and fought all the way into Austria. I was on full throttle for far too long a time and my electrical system on the coolant shutters went out. When they closed, the engine overheated and I lost all of my coolant, If I hadn’t been so close to Switzerland I would have ended up as a Prisoner of War or dead. I was looking for a place to land, since I did not want to jump. I found this very short meadow that had some white signs on it so I thought that I should try it. I had no other choice. I used full flaps with no power from the engine and I landed slightly on the tail wheel. There was no one there when I landed, but as soon as I stopped, here they came. The Swiss had helmets similar to the Germans, and I was not sure where I was. I stood up in the cockpit with my hands raised and asked if they were Swiss. Luckily they said yes!” Simpson’s Mustang was later repaired and taken on charge by the Swiss Air Force.
The 55th Fighter Group gave up their P-38s for P-51s in the summer of 1944. (USAF official)
On August 6, the 357th group provided escort for another shuttle mission to the Soviet Union. They picked up the B-17s after they hit the Focke-Wulf assembly plant at Rahmel. The bombers had been escorted by the 55th group, led by new group commander John D. Landers in their first P-51 operation. The mission to Gydina and back to England covered 1,595 miles in seven flying hours.
Over Poland, nine Bf 109s from JG 51 went after the bombers, but 1st Lt Robert Shaw’s flight cut them off. Shaw shot one down in flames while element leader 1st Lt “Bud” Nowlin chased the fighter flown by Hauptmann Gunther Schack, Staffelkapitän 7./III./JG.51. Schack split with Nowlin in pursuit. A burst hit the 109's radiator and brought a spray of coolant before it slowed so dramatically that Nowlin overran the fighter. Pulling alongside Schack, he realized he had to preserve fuel. He waved and climbed away, not discovering until he met Schack 40 years that shortly after, Schack bailed out.
That same day saw George Preddy’s best day ever. When the group had been informed the night before that the August 6 mission would be scrubbed for weather, Preddy spent the night drinking and shooting craps, he got gloriously drunk and won $1,200. He had been asleep an hour when he was awakened with the news the mission was on. Not only did he have a major hangover, but he was supposed to lead the mission! He spent 30 minutes in his cockpit breathing pure oxygen to clear his head, but even so he vomited in his cockpit while flying across the sea.
Ninety minutes later, the bombers were approaching Hamburg when 30 Bf 109s were spotted stalking the bombers. Preddy led White Flight in a bounce from the rear. He later reported, “I opened fire on one near the rear of the formation from 300 yards and got many hits around the canopy. The enemy aircraft went down inverted and in flames. At this time, Lieutenant Doleac became lost while shooting down an Me 109 that had latched onto Lieutenant Heyer’s tail.” Preddy and Heyer continued their attack. Preddy got behind his second victory and got hits around the wing roots, setting the ‘109 on fire. “He went spinning down and the pilot bailed out at twenty thousand feet.” Heyer shot down another Bf 109.
The 357th's P-51D-15 "Missouri Armada" was flown by Captain John B. England. (USAF Official)
The enemy formation stayed together with the pilots taking practically no evasive action as the formation tried to maneuver to attack the bombers. “We continued our attack on the rear end and I fired on another at close range. He went down smoking, and I saw him begin to fall
apart below us” Another flight of P-51s joined the fight. “I fired at another ’109, causing him to burn after a short burst. He spiraled down in flames.” Still the Germans stayed together as they made a left turn to attempt another attack. “I got a good burst into another one, causing him to burn and spin down. The enemy aircraft were down to five thousand now.” One pulled off to the left in an attempt to engage Preddy. “I was all alone with them now, so I went after this single ’109 before he could get on my tail. I got in an ineffective burst, causing him to smoke a little. I pulled up into a steep climb to the left above him and he climbed after me. I pulled it in as tight as possible and climbed.” The enemy pilot opened fire ineffectively as Preddy outclimbed him in a zoom. “He fell off to the left and I dropped astern of him. He jettisoned his canopy as I fired a short burst, getting many hits. As I pulled past, the pilot bailed out at seven thousand feet. I had lost contact with friendly and enemy aircraft, so I headed home.”
George Preddy had just shot down six enemy fighters in one battle. It would be the ETO record.
Preddy was still suffering from the epic drinking bout when he landed. When he shoved open his canopy, everyone wanted to know his score. His first words were “NEVER AGAIN!” With this, his score was 28, 24 scored in the P-51 to make him the leading Mustang ace. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his record mission, and given 30 days leave back home.
As the Fw 190A-8/R2 Sturmbocks became more effective, VIII Fighter Command sent fighter groups ahead of the bombers to find and break up the Sturmgruppen formations.
On August 15, II./JG 300 attacked the 303rd “Hell’s Angels” group when they found the bombers headed for Wiesbaden near Trier. The Sturmbocks popped out of the clouds and shot down nine B-17s from the low formation. Minutes later, Bf 109Gs from I./JG 300 found the 466th group’s B-24s near Meppel and shot down four. The defending gunners claimed four Fw 190s and nine Bf 109s respectively. On August 16, IV./JG 3 attacked the 91st group near Halle and claimed six B-17s in trade for six Fw 190s in a four minute battle.
August 24 saw the loss of the Fourth’s Major John T. Godfrey in a freak “friendly fire” incident. Leading the 336th squadron, Godfrey spotted Ju 52/3m transports on the airfield at Nordhausen. He led the strafing attack and shot up four while his wingman 1st Lieutenant Melvin Dickey shot up three. The light flak was intense and Godfrey jinked to make himself a difficult target. In so doing, he flew into Dickey’s line of fire as he opened up on a fourth ground target. Godfrey’s P-51 was hit in the engine and the coolant system. With the termperature gauge “off the peg” as he later recalled, Godfrey bellied in beyond the field and managed to get out of the airplane as it caught fire and reach cover before the enemy troops arrived, despite suffering cuts to his head and leg.
At the time he went down, Godfrey was tied with Jim Goodson as leading ace of the Fourth, with 29.88 air and ground victories. After three days on the run and walking 13 miles, he tried to catch a ride in a boxcar outside Nordhausen, but was captured by railway guards. He later wrote that being captured and spending eight months as a POW was “the best thing that could have happened to me,” since he had been obsessed with becoming the top ace of the ETO. “Prison taught me what was really important in life.”
September 11 saw the strongest Jagdwaffe reaction to a bombing raid since May 28. It also saw another Eighth Air Force “Frantic” mission, in which 75 B-17s of the 96th and 452nd bomb groups bombed Chemnitz then headed on east, escorted by the 20th Fighter Group. While there was no enemy response, the force had to pick their way through heavy weather to land at Ukrainian bases. The bombers hit targets in Hungary on their way to Italy and the full force was back in England by September 17.
The other escort groups saw plenty of action on September 11. One of the forces attacked the Leuna factory in “Mercilessburg.” Seven JG 400 Me 163s attacked one formation, claiming three B-17s in the vicinity of Leipzig. The “Bloody Hundredth” 100th Bomb Group was lagging, they were hit by an entire Sturmgruppe and 13 B-17s went down in the five-minute battle. Had it not been for the timely arrival of the 339th Fighter Group’s Mustangs, the result might have been worse, but the P-51s shot down a good number of enemy fighters. The 92nd bomb group was also hit, losing eight, with four others so badly damaged they made emergency landings at Allied airfields in France. The U.S. fighters overall claimed an incredible 116 victories for the day.
On September 12, the bombers hit the synthetic fuel factory outside Magdeburg. The Jagdwaffe again made a strong showing, the groups reported loss of 23 B-17s. Overall, 43 bombers were lost, but against these enemy successes, American fighters returned with claims for 125 shot down.
P-51D-10 "Pauline" of the 339th Fighter Group. One of the last fighter groups to join VIII fighter Command, the 339th FG established themselves as ground attack specialists when the Luftwaffe stopped flying for lack of fuel. (USAF Official)
On September 13, the Mustangs claimed 150 shot down. The famous names from the previous year were gone, returned home at the end of their tours or shot down. Their replacements demonstrated the result of the strong training program created in the previous two years back in the United States.
By this point, loss of regular supplies of aviation gasoline due to the destruction of the synthetic oil factories left the Luftwaffe only able to put in occasional appearances, when the geschwadern were able to collect sufficient gas to mount a mission.
The synthetic oil campaign carried out in the summer of 1944 was the first true test of the belief that daylight precision bombing could fatally disable the German economy. Eighth Air Force flew 28 missions in June, 27 in July and 23 in August and 15 in September - so fast that some bomber crews completed their 35 mission tours in only a few months - with the majority of the missions targeting the synthetic oil industry.
In the end, the campaign was won by carpet bombing the plants, causing simultaneous damage to several plants at a time, which was beyond the means of the German repair organization to return them to even a modest percentage of pre-campaign production. By September, synthetic oil production was nine percent of what it had been in May, and the Ploesti oilfields were in the hands of the Soviets. The German aircraft industry achieved its highest monthly production total in September, but the overwhelming majority of the airplanes produced never flew for lack of fuel.
Over the course of the campaign, Eighth Air Force lost almost half its operational bomber strength: 1,022 B-17s and B-24s, as well as 665 P-38s, P-47s and P-51s. While the loss rate was 1.5 percent over 35 missions as compared to 3.6 percent over 25 missions during the “Battle of Germany” that spring, an aircrewman in the Eighth still had a one-in-three chance of being killed or made prisoner during his tour.
After the war, Albert Speer told his interrogators that if the Allied Air Forces had made these plants their sole objective during the summer of 1944, they could have forced a German surrender in eight weeks, which would have allowed the airmen to achieve their dream of winning the war themselves. As it was, what was accomplished likely shortened the European war by six months.
Editor's Notes: The author is responsible for the historical, terminological and technical accuracy of the article.