Strana 32
#82176BOXART STORY
On the morning of June 6, 1944, when the Allies
landed in Normandy, the Luftwaffe was prepared
for the situation. A plan was in place to reinforce
the six Jagdgruppen (day fighter groups) opera-
ting in France under Luftflotte 3. Defensive pre-
parations were conducted under the codename
Dr. Gustav West (Drohende Gefahr West – Threat
Approaching from the West). By the evening of
June 6, two reconnaissance Gruppen, five bom-
ber Gruppen, two ground Schlachtgruppen, and
one Geschwaderstab were to be relocated from
Germany to France, along with eight night fighter
Gruppen, two Geschwaderstabs, two day fighter
Jagdstaffeln, and nineteen Jagdgruppen with five
Geschwaderstabs. Of these nineteen, eight were
assigned to II. Fliegerkorps as fighter-bombers,
while the remaining units were placed under II.
Jagdkorps. Meanwhile, Luftflotte Reich retained
only four fighter Gruppen and "Wilde Sau" units
alongside second-line formations.
Luftwaffe command first needed to confirm that
the landings in Normandy were a full-scale in-
vasion and not a probing attack similar to the 1942
Dieppe Raid. Consequently, orders for redeploy-
ment to France were only issued around noon on
June 6. Not all Jagdgruppen were transferred as
planned, and by the evening of June 7, only seven-
teen Jagdgruppen had reached the combat area,
equating to a nominal strength of about 1,100 air-
craft. However, the actual number of operational
fighters was just a quarter of that, 278 aircraft.
Many units had only half or even les of their air-
craft, and not all of these were airworthy due to
the hasty deployment, lack of proper ground supp-
ort, and general chaos at most French airfields.
Luftwaffe in France faced superiority from the
Allies, their airfields were regularly targeted by
low-level strafing attacks and strategic bombing
raids. The Luftwaffe was unable to regain control
of the skies. German pilots, whether fresh recruits
or veterans who had spent months or years figh-
ting against Allied heavy bomber formations, stru-
ggled to conduct effective ground-attack missions
using bombs. As a result, the eight units were
relieved of fighter-bomber duties by June 12 and
reassigned to 5. Jagddivision under Oberst Hent-
schel, which reported to II. Jagdkorps. The II. Flie-
gerkorps, which had been responsible for ground
attack strikes, was disbanded on June 28, and in
the following weeks, fighter pilots relied solely
on onboard weapons or 210mm BR 21 rockets for
ground attacks.
With around twenty Jagdgruppen under its co-
mmand, 5. Jagddivision lacked the capability to
micromanage their operations. As a result, most
combat orders in June 1944 consisted of free
hunting, intercepting low-flying strafers, and en-
gaging artillery spotter aircraft. Only rarely were
German fighters directed against Allied bomber
formations, as 5. Jagddivision lacked the nece-
ssary numbers for such operations. The priority
remained defending German ground forces from
strafing attacks. Fighter missions conducted in
formations smaller than 20 aircraft were highly
risky. On average, each operational fighter flew
two sorties daily, with operations running from 6
AM to 11 PM. In each sortie, Luftwaffe units typica-
lly lost about 30% of their aircraft. For every Allied
aircraft shot down, the Germans lost two to three
of their own. When German units managed to exe-
cute missions successfully with minimal losses,
it was usually due to bad weather.
This period is depicted in the box art by Piotr
Forkasiewicz, which portrays Major George E.
Preddy’s aircraft from the 487th FS, 352nd FG, du-
ring a dogfight on June 12, 1944. Preddy’s unit was
escorting American bombers targeting the railway
junction in Rennes, Brittany. At the time, a funeral
was taking place in the city for victims of a previ-
ous bombing raid carried out by RAF bombers on
June 9.
The German adversaries were Bf 109 pilots
from II./JG 53. After the engagement, they repor-
ted five victories over Liberators, one confirmed
kill and four aircraft forced to abandon formation.
However, the Germans lost three of their own
aircraft, and two pilots were wounded. One pilot,
while engaged with a P-51, was even hit by his
own flak. These losses closely matched the con-
firmed victories recorded by the Americans: 1st Lt.
Glennon T. Moran was credited with one kill, whi-
le 1st Lt. Lawrence E. McCarthy and 1st Lt. John
Francis Thornell Jr. shared another. Major Preddy
claimed the third Bf 109.
Four American bombers sustained damage,
additionally one bomber was lost each by 448th
BG and 446th BG. Six American aircrew members
were killed, one was captured, but the remaining
survivors were rescued by the French. The two
bombing raids caused massive destruction to the
city’s infrastructure and resulted in the deaths of
122 civilians. Rennes was eventually liberated in
early August 1944.
Text: Jan Bobek
Piotr Forkasiewicz
Dogfight over Rennes
INFO Eduard32
March 2025