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Strana 12

TASK FORCE 58 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN
Over the two days, the Shiden unit flew four
combat missions, each involving three or four
aircraft. The Zero unit flew nine missions, with
the number of aircraft ranging from 24 down
to three. For its final mission on 17 February,
it committed 14 Zeros.
After the engagements on 16 February, its
airmen claimed six confirmed kills and six
aircraft damaged. In the fighting on 17 February,
Tsukuba Kōkūtai’s fighters claimed two aircraft
shot down for certain, one probably destroyed
and one damaged.
Over the two days, the unit lost 15 aircraft,
12 of them on the first day of fighting. Two more
made forced landings, and another five were
damaged. Eighteen pilots were killed and four
wounded.
After the clashes with Task Force 58,
Tsukuba Kōkūtai’s fighter unit had 15 Model 52
Zeros and the same number of pilots available.
The unit’s records singled out Petty Officer
First Class Takanobu Obata for special praise.
On his fourth sortie on 16 February, he faced
30 Hellcats alone and managed to shoot
down three. On the morning of 16 February,
Tsukuba Kōkūtai probably engaged Hellcats
from VF-12 (USS Randolph); in the afternoon,
it encountered Hellcats from VF-46 escorting
Avengers from VT-46 (USS Cowpens).
On 17 February, Tsukuba Kōkūtai very likely
engaged the Hellcats of the VBF-3 mentioned
above. Although the Americans suffered
no losses, Lt. Toshihide Kihara claimed one
Hellcat in the encounter. The engagement is
depicted on Piotr Forkasiewicz’s box art.
e Japanese Assessment
The Tsukuba Kōkūtai war diary contains
an interesting passage summarizing the
lessons drawn from the fighting on 16 and
17 February 1945. It mentions, for example,
instances in which training aircraft became
involved in combat with the Americans.
Several observations correctly identify the
principles behind US Navy fighter tactics. The
diary also offers interesting details about the
unit’s own defensive measures and points out
the conditions under which the Americans
failed to spot large numbers of aircraft on
the ground. One question remains: how and
why did a unit devoted to advanced training
gain combat experience against the enemy in
this engagement? All the observations in this
section of the report had already been known
to Imperial Japanese Navy combat units for
several years:
Lessons learned
1. Interception operations
a. Reasons for the heavy losses suffered
by a fighter unit formed from the group’s
instructors and teaching staff
1. Difficulty converting training equipment and
procedures to operational use
Under group policy, our primary mission is
training, and at present we are using 87-octane
fuel as our principal fuel. Consequently,
converting to operational conditions is
extremely difficult unless at least half a day
is available. In this instance, maintenance
continued until immediately before the
interceptors were launched; test flights and
test firing were therefore inadequate.
2. Inadequate training of unit personnel
Ground instruction incorporating lessons
from combat was conducted as circumstances
permitted. However, so-called unit training
conducted by instructors and teaching staff
could not be carried out because of shortages
of fuel and equipment. As a result, during the
first interception in this engagement, some
personnel repeated mistakes resembling
those made before.
3. Need for comprehensive training in rapid
launch, rendezvous, and interception
In frontline units, routine actions against
the enemy are already part of training. After
takeoff, they can assemble without delay, form
up, cooperate as a formation, and bring their
full strength to bear. In our unit, by contrast,
rendezvous and assembly were generally poor,
and a considerable number of aircraft were
attacked individually.
4. Insufficient awareness of the enemy during
alert takeoffs and landings
Most personnel were entering combat
for the first time. Although they plunged into
battle with courage and determination, some
lacked awareness of the enemy during takeoff
A damaged VF-3 Hellcat after landing aboard USS Yorktown following a raid on the Tokyo area on 17 February
1945. Lt. Henry M. “Shorty” Rowland brought the aircraft back. Photo: US Naval Heritage Command
CPO Takanobu Obata, Tsukuba Kōkūtai, Japan, February 1945
INFO Eduard12
November 2026

TASK FORCE 58 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN

Lessons learned 1. Interception operations

a. Reasons for the heavy losses suffered by a fighter unit formed from the group’s instructors and teaching staff

A damaged VF-3 Hellcat after landing aboard USS Yorktown following a raid on the Tokyo area on 17 February 1945. Lt. Henry M. “Shorty” Rowland brought the aircraft back. Photo: US Naval Heritage Command

1. Difficulty converting training equipment and procedures to operational use

Under group policy, our primary mission is training, and at present we are using 87-octane fuel as our principal fuel. Consequently, converting to operational conditions is extremely difficult unless at least half a day is available. In this instance, maintenance continued until immediately before the interceptors were launched; test flights and test firing were therefore inadequate.

Over the two days, the Shiden unit flew four combat missions, each involving three or four aircraft. The Zero unit flew nine missions, with the number of aircraft ranging from 24 down to three. For its final mission on 17 February, it committed 14 Zeros.

After the engagements on 16 February, its airmen claimed six confirmed kills and six aircraft damaged. In the fighting on 17 February, Tsukuba Kōkūtai’s fighters claimed two aircraft shot down for certain, one probably destroyed and one damaged.

Over the two days, the unit lost 15 aircraft, 12 of them on the first day of fighting. Two more made forced landings, and another five were damaged. Eighteen pilots were killed and four wounded.

After the clashes with Task Force 58, Tsukuba Kōkūtai’s fighter unit had 15 Model 52 Zeros and the same number of pilots available. The unit’s records singled out Petty Officer First Class Takanobu Obata for special praise. On his fourth sortie on 16 February, he faced 30 Hellcats alone and managed to shoot down three. On the morning of 16 February, Tsukuba Kōkūtai probably engaged Hellcats from VF-12 (USS Randolph); in the afternoon, it encountered Hellcats from VF-46 escorting

Avengers from VT-46 (USS Cowpens). 2. Inadequate training of unit personnel On 17 February, Tsukuba Kōkūtai very likely engaged the Hellcats of the VBF-3 mentioned above. Although the Americans suffered no losses, Lt. Toshihide Kihara claimed one Hellcat in the encounter. The engagement is depicted on Piotr Forkasiewicz’s box art.

The Japanese Assessment

The Tsukuba Kōkūtai war diary contains an interesting passage summarizing the lessons drawn from the fighting on 16 and 17 February 1945. It mentions, for example, instances in which training aircraft became involved in combat with the Americans. Several observations correctly identify the principles behind US Navy fighter tactics. The diary also offers interesting details about the unit’s own defensive measures and points out the conditions under which the Americans failed to spot large numbers of aircraft on the ground. One question remains: how and why did a unit devoted to advanced training gain combat experience against the enemy in this engagement? All the observations in this section of the report had already been known to Imperial Japanese Navy combat units for several years:

Ground instruction incorporating lessons from combat was conducted as circumstances permitted. However, so-called unit training conducted by instructors and teaching staff could not be carried out because of shortages of fuel and equipment. As a result, during the first interception in this engagement, some personnel repeated mistakes resembling those made before.

3. Need for comprehensive training in rapid launch, rendezvous, and interception In frontline units, routine actions against the enemy are already part of training. After takeoff, they can assemble without delay, form up, cooperate as a formation, and bring their full strength to bear. In our unit, by contrast, rendezvous and assembly were generally poor, and a considerable number of aircraft were attacked individually.

4. Insufficient awareness of the enemy during alert takeoffs and landings

Most personnel were entering combat for the first time. Although they plunged into battle with courage and determination, some lacked awareness of the enemy during takeoff

12

INFO Eduard

CPO Takanobu Obata, Tsukuba Kōkūtai, Japan, February 1945

November 2026

Info EDUARD