Task Force 58 off the Coast of Japan
Reconstruction of the 17 February 1945 engagement by Piotr Forkasiewicz depicts Hellcats of VBF-3 from USS Yorktown clashing with Zeros of Tsukuba Kōkūtai. In the foreground is the aircraft of Lt. Toshihide Kihara, who claimed one Hellcat shot down in the encounter.
Two enemy units’ perspectives on the fighting in February 1945
Text: Jan Bobek
The US Navy’s raids on Japan in mid-February 1945 were the first major test for Japanese air units facing low-flying attackers over their homeland. For American airmen, it was an exhilarating, truly historic moment: they had the chance to strike at the heart of the Japanese Empire from aircraft carriers operating just a few dozen nautical miles off enemy shores.
Raids on Japan
When Japan became the target of a raid by B-25 Mitchell bombers launched from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet under Jimmy Doolittle’s command in April 1942, the attack did not come as a complete surprise. The Japanese knew roughly where the American ships were. What they did not expect was that the carrier would be carrying twin-engine bombers, which would continue on to the Chinese interior.
The Americans had to launch the bombers from USS Hornet 600 nautical miles from the Japanese coast, rather than the originally planned 400 nautical miles. They feared the task force had been discovered. After the raid, the Japanese Navy tried to pursue the American force, but without success.
The first raids on Japan by four-engine B-29 bombers began in the second half of 1944, from bases in China. The Japanese military sought to disrupt these bomber units’ operations, or stop them altogether, through its advances. By the end of 1944, however, B-29 formations had begun raiding also from the south, from bases in the Marianas.
After the Philippines were captured at the turn of 1944–45, the Allies’ next targets for amphibious landings were the islands of Iwo Jima in mid-February 1945 and Okinawa in early April.
A Mitsubishi A6M2 Model 21 of Tsukuba Kōkūtai, photographed during the latter half of the Pacific War. Photo: SDASM
Task Force 58
US Navy carriers did not approach the Japanese coast again until nearly two years later, in the first half of February 1945. Their targets were airfields and other facilities in the Tokyo area. The raids of 16 and 17 February 1945 were intended to weaken Japan’s ability to strike at the Allied landings on Iwo Jima, scheduled for 19 February.
The raid was to be carried out by Task Force 58, commanded by Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher. The same officer, then a skipper, had commanded USS Hornet with rank of Captain during the Doolittle Raid.
This time, however, his force had 11 fleet aircraft carriers and five escort carriers at its disposal. They were accompanied by eight battleships, 14 cruisers and 77 destroyers.
The carriers’ air groups included not only US Navy units but also several US Marine Corps squadrons. Half of the carrier air groups had yet to encounter the enemy. After several months of raids by Japan’s special attack units, known in the Japanese Navy as kamikaze, the composition of US Navy carrier air groups had changed. Fleet carriers now embarked 73 fighters (Hellcats and Corsairs), with the remaining 30 made up of dive-bombers and torpedo-bombers.
On 16 February 1945, Task Force 58 closed to within 60 nautical miles off the Japanese coast, 90 miles south of Tokyo. The approach followed a high-speed voyage under strict radio silence and in fairly poor weather. A group of five destroyers steamed ahead of the task force, while carrier aircraft flew anti-submarine patrols.
The Japanese, however, were expecting an attack around this time. Japanese Navy and Army fighter units, along with several operational training units, met the American airmen in extremely difficult weather. Antiaircraft defenses were also highly active. American pilots nicknamed one stretch of road between Tokyo and Yokohama “Flak Highway.”
On 16 February, carrier airmen flew seven strikes. The following day, as the weather deteriorated, they launched only four.
Aerial view of Tsukuba air base in Japan. Photo: Wikimedia Commons
Results of the Engagement
Over the two days, TF 58 aircraft flew 2,761 operational sorties, including patrol missions. American airmen claimed 341 Japanese aircraft shot down and destroyed 190 on the ground. The carrier air groups, which committed 738 aircraft, lost 60 in combat and another 28 to other causes. Hellcats and Corsairs accounted for the overwhelming majority of aircraft lost. A total of 20 fighter pilots or bomber aircrew were rescued from the sea. The carrier air group aboard USS Bennington suffered the heaviest losses, losing 12 aircraft: six Hellcats and five pilots from VF-82, and six Corsairs (including one FG-1D) and three pilots from VMF-123.
On the Japanese side, Navy fighter units claimed 98 victories during the two days of fighting and lost 30 pilots. Their Army Air Force counterparts claimed 62 American aircraft shot down and 27 damaged on 16 February, while losing 34 of their own aircraft. On 17 February, Army fighters lost 14 aircraft and reported 36 confirmed victories, with another 18 American aircraft claimed as damaged.
Aircraft carriers and other vessels anchored at Ulithi Atoll, 8 December 1944. The carriers in the line, from front to rear, are USS Wasp (CV-18), USS Yorktown (CV-10), USS Hornet (CV-19), USS Hancock (CV-19) and USS Ticonderoga (CV-140). USS Lexington (CV-16) is in the left background. Most of these ships took part in Task Force 58’s raids on Japan in February 1945. Photo: US Naval Heritage Command
VBF-3 in Action
One account of those two days comes from the chronicle of VBF-3, the “Crazy Cats,” which had been part of the carrier air group aboard USS Yorktown since the beginning of 1945. The squadron was commanded by Lt. Cmdr. Fritz Wolf, a veteran of the fighting in China who had scored four victories with the AVG’s “Flying Tigers” and later served with VF-11 aboard the USS Hornet. Lt. Cmdr. John McBrayer, transferred from VF-81 and previously assigned to the first USS Wasp, served as executive officer.
VBF-3’s pilots were somewhat resentful of their bombing role, signified by the letter B in the unit’s designation. They flew aircraft shared with their former VF-3 colleagues and carried out the same missions. Many pilots ignored the VBF-3 designation and continued to identify themselves as VF-3.
Grumman F6F Hellcats warm up their engines on the flight deck of USS Hornet (CV-12) before taking off for raids on Tokyo, Japan, in February 1945. Photo: US Naval Heritage Command
One of them described the two days of raids on Japan this way:
On the morning of 16 February Lieut. Comdr. Wolf led a flight to that target - the Kasumigaura area northeast of the city of Tokyo - and established, if our information is correct, an impressive first. This sweep was the YORKTOWN'S 2-A flight, launched immediately after the 1-A sweep at 0718 (K). The earlier hop suffered the same fate which, so far as we are able to discover, met all the other A flight from the force a heavy blanketing overcast which turned back short of the Honshu coast.
Lieut. Comdr. Wolf took his fighter in low, flying in the base of the clouds, and from there attacked Konoike Airfield. While the attack was in progress the weather began to break, and, for the rest of the day, the target was open. Thus the flight was, to the best of our know ledge, the first to get in that day. If so the VBF-3 pilots were the first carrier-based Navy pilots, and the first fighter pilots, ever to attack the sacred soil of the empire of Japan. And they drew first blood in fair quantities 4 enemy planes shot down, 1 airborne damaged, and on the ground, 9 destroyed, 4 probables, 17 damaged. Konoike and Hokoda were the airfields offering up their sitting ducks and, in the process of accepting the offer, none of our planes was damaged.
The fighting encountered and engaged in by this flight set a pattern that was to be repeated, with few exceptions, on all subsequent hops over the area. Airborne opposition was met, of course, and in substantial quantities, but it never proved too hot to handle. The Japanese pilot were individual runs from in or at the base of the cloud cover, diving down into our formation. The runs were met and countered and, in most cases, the attacker was shot down or damaged. At no time did the enemy make coordinated attacks or division or section runs. His tactics were aggressive but ineffectual, and his approaches were often embellished by aerobatics on the way in. Occasionally he would not open fire at all, but simply dive into the midst of our fighters. He had a few tricks up his sleeve - dummy pilot on parachutes and, on one later flight, an attempted suicide ramming - but these were poor substitutes for valid offensive tactics or accurate shooting.
Two SB2C-3 Helldiver dive-bombers from USS Lexington (CV-16) fly over Task Force 58 en route to Tokyo, circa 16 February 1945. The ships below include an Essex-class carrier, a New Orleans-class cruiser and a destroyer. Photo: US Naval Heritage Command
The difficulties encountered by our pilots were also repeated on later flights. The area was a strange one and, to a large extent, unknown. Intelligence, before the operation, had only the small scale, high altitude photographs of the area which Army B-29's had taken. Ground intelligence was entirely lacking. Briefings based on this meager material had to be sketchy and provisional, and as a result, pilots went into the target with only a general idea of the lay of the land. Orientation had to be made on the flight itself and, in one or two instances, prior information proved to be inaccurate. Again, for many of the pilots this was the first heady taste of aerial combat after weeks of attacking ground targets and dodging flak, and they were eager to seize every opportunity. This not altogether commendable eagerness often made rendezvous a slow process and, time and again, left juicy ground targets untouched while airborne stragglers were chased off into other areas. Finally the weather, while never bad, was never clear and unlimited, and there were always some clouds for the Japanese interceptors to retire into. But the troubles were incidental. The richness of the prize compensated for all that.
A second sweep, a strike, and a RAPCAP were still to be flown on this day and, when they were over, the score had grown splendidly. Lt. Williams led the second sweep, the fighter this time carrying rockets, and succeeded in taking them to Mawatari Airfield for a ground attack before the air borne opposition grew so intense that they were forced to stay aloft. Again our tactics proved superior to the enemy's. The section proved to be a strong unit, both offensively and defensively. The standard weave was used to advantage. The 7-0 score of airborne kills and the fact that no F6F was hit at any time by enemy fire substantiates this. It was on this flight that Lt. Williams met the anti-social character who tried to ram him, and got a smoking engine for his pains. When the hop returned to base it left 18 of Mawatari's deckload of planes destroyed or damaged.
The strike, launched in the afternoon, was deflected to a secondary target because of insufficient time after a delayed take-off. The extensive facilities at Kasumigaura Airfield were hit by the bombers. Lt.Cmdr Wolf led the fighters and, again, they found plenty to keep them busy aloft. Our fighters were jumped both on approach and retirement but no attackers go through to the bombers. On this flight our fighters encountered the closest approximation to coordinated attacks that the Japanese could offer. An attacking enemy would be followed at 100 to 200 yards by another, who would attempt to reach a firing position on whatever plane or planes attacked the leader. Once this device secured hits. Lt(jg) Chamber (on loan from VF-3) was on the tail of a probable Jack, firing into him, when a following Tony came down in a high-side on him. Lt.Cmdr. Wolf saw the second enemy firing at the F6F and turned into him and shot him down. More often, however, the interceptors came one at a time. The split, was their favorite evasive device, and would seem to be the only defensive maneuver they knew.
A Mitsubishi A6M5 Type 52a of Tsukuba Kōkūtai, photographed during the final year of the war. The 20 mm cannon have been removed from the wings. This aircraft was license-built by Nakajima. Photo: SDASM
The flight came back with 8 kills to its credit, 3 probables, 7 damaged – all airborne. Two of our planes had been slightly damaged.
Lt. Hopp's division, on RAPCAP, had in the meantime contributed a Jill and a Tony to the day's score. The final results were: airborne – 21 destroyed, 6 probables, 10 damaged; and on the ground – 15 destroyed, 5 probables, 28 damaged. We had lost no planes or pilots, had minor damage to two planes.
To that total one more item must be added. Lt(jg) Jones, loaned from the squadron to fly in the Group Commander's division, turned in a brilliant solo performance by shooting down 3 Zekes on a single hop. The mission was target coordination and the division was launched with a flight from VF-3. But VBF-3 proudly claims its own and modestly adds Jone's Zekes to the total, making the airborne kills 24.
If the operations had been continued throughout the (whole) 17th, the second day's score would probably have surpassed the first in all categories. As it was, VBF-3 flew only two hops and boosted the totals impressively. The first flight was a sweep in to Ishioka and Tsukuba Airfields, led by Lt.Comdr. Wolf. On this mission Lt.(jg) Jones, again flying with the target co-ordinator's division, again turned in a multiple kill, this time getting a Hamp and a Oscar. Ens. Stroder, a photo pilot, flying wing on Jones, matched this exactly, even to the identities of his victims. Lt. Williams led the second sweep and bored farther inland than any of his predecessors had gone, attacking Utsonomiya Airfield and reaping heavy damage there. Airborne opposition was about what it had been on previous flights, and the sweep shot down 7 with 3 probables and 3 damaged. All later flights were canceled and the force retired. The second day's score, then was: in the air: 13 shot down, 3 probables, 3 damaged; an the ground: 5 destroyed, 4 probables, 28 damaged. And, for the second day, our losses were none.
We should add that the only aircraft lost by USS Yorktown’s air group during the two-day operation was an F6F-5 from VF-3, but its pilot, Ens. J. T. Graham, was rescued.
Damage to the Tachikawa aircraft-engine factory following one of the US Navy’s attacks near Tokyo on 17 February 1945. Photo: US Naval Heritage Command
The Battle over Tsukuba
A unique insight into the Japanese side comes from the war diary of the Tsukuba Kōkūtai operational training unit, held at the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records. I covered the brief history of Tsukuba Kōkūtai in the July 2025 issue of INFO Eduard.
Its ranks included veterans of combat against American air forces. At the time of the American attack, Tsukuba Kōkūtai was undergoing two changes beyond its usual activities. At the end of 1944, a fighter squadron equipped with A6M and N1K Shiden (George 11) aircraft was formed within the unit. From February 1945, Tsukuba Kōkūtai was preparing detachments to train and deploy kamikaze airmen.
On 15 February, Tsukuba Kōkūtai received a report of an American task force about 180 nautical miles west of Truk, steering a course of 320 degrees. It was unclear whether aircraft carriers were among its ships. The threat was serious enough, however, for the highest state of alert to be declared in the Ogasawara Islands and the Japanese home islands from 16 February.
Intensive aircraft maintenance began on 15 February, with the aim of making as many Zeros combat-ready as possible. In addition, 13 Model 52 Zeros were brought to Tsukuba from Koizumi air base, bringing the number of operational aircraft to 24. A command post for combat operations was also established within the training unit. Standard fighter aircraft were assigned to engage the Americans; trainees, training aircraft and other equipment were to be kept out of combat.
From 16 February, the training aircraft were ready for evacuation to the air bases at Kōriyama or Matsushima. Training at Tsukuba continued only in part. Instruction for students in the 42nd aviation course continued, but advanced training and preparation for future members of special attack units were suspended.
On 16 February, Tsukuba Kōkūtai had four Shiden fighters and 24 Zeros available for combat operations; on 17 February, it had 21 Zeros.
Over the two days, the Shiden unit flew four combat missions, each involving three or four aircraft. The Zero unit flew nine missions, with the number of aircraft ranging from 24 down to three. For its final mission on 17 February, it committed 14 Zeros.
After the engagements on 16 February, its airmen claimed six confirmed kills and six aircraft damaged. In the fighting on 17 February, Tsukuba Kōkūtai’s fighters claimed two aircraft shot down for certain, one probably destroyed and one damaged.
Over the two days, the unit lost 15 aircraft, 12 of them on the first day of fighting. Two more made forced landings, and another five were damaged. Eighteen pilots were killed and four wounded.
After the clashes with Task Force 58, Tsukuba Kōkūtai’s fighter unit had 15 Model 52 Zeros and the same number of pilots available.
The unit’s records singled out Petty Officer First Class Takanobu Obata for special praise. On his fourth sortie on 16 February, he faced 30 Hellcats alone and managed to shoot down three. On the morning of 16 February, Tsukuba Kōkūtai probably engaged Hellcats from VF-12 (USS Randolph); in the afternoon, it encountered Hellcats from VF-46 escorting Avengers from VT-46 (USS Cowpens).
On 17 February, Tsukuba Kōkūtai very likely engaged the Hellcats of the VBF-3 mentioned above. Although the Americans suffered no losses, Lt. Toshihide Kihara claimed one Hellcat in the encounter. The engagement is depicted on Piotr Forkasiewicz’s box art.
A damaged VF-3 Hellcat after landing aboard USS Yorktown following a raid on the Tokyo area on 17 February 1945. Lt. Henry M. “Shorty” Rowland brought the aircraft back. Photo: US Naval Heritage Command
The Japanese Assessment
The Tsukuba Kōkūtai war diary contains an interesting passage summarizing the lessons drawn from the fighting on 16 and 17 February 1945. It mentions, for example, instances in which training aircraft became involved in combat with the Americans. Several observations correctly identify the principles behind US Navy fighter tactics. The diary also offers interesting details about the unit’s own defensive measures and points out the conditions under which the Americans failed to spot large numbers of aircraft on the ground. One question remains: how and why did a unit devoted to advanced training gain combat experience against the enemy in this engagement? All the observations in this section of the report had already been known to Imperial Japanese Navy combat units for several years:
Lessons learned
1. Interception operations
a. Reasons for the heavy losses suffered by a fighter unit formed from the group’s instructors and teaching staff
1. Difficulty converting training equipment and procedures to operational use
Under group policy, our primary mission is training, and at present we are using 87-octane fuel as our principal fuel. Consequently, converting to operational conditions is extremely difficult unless at least half a day is available. In this instance, maintenance continued until immediately before the interceptors were launched; test flights and test firing were therefore inadequate.
2. Inadequate training of unit personnel
Ground instruction incorporating lessons from combat was conducted as circumstances permitted. However, so-called unit training conducted by instructors and teaching staff could not be carried out because of shortages of fuel and equipment. As a result, during the first interception in this engagement, some personnel repeated mistakes resembling those made before.
3. Need for comprehensive training in rapid launch, rendezvous, and interception
In frontline units, routine actions against the enemy are already part of training. After takeoff, they can assemble without delay, form up, cooperate as a formation, and bring their full strength to bear. In our unit, by contrast, rendezvous and assembly were generally poor, and a considerable number of aircraft were attacked individually.
4. Insufficient awareness of the enemy during alert takeoffs and landings
Most personnel were entering combat for the first time. Although they plunged into battle with courage and determination, some lacked awareness of the enemy during takeoff and landing. For example:
(A) Returning fighters were lined up in a single row, as during routine training, with no regard for enemy strafing. Aircraft must instead be dispersed irregularly, with at least 50 meters between them fore and aft and to either side.
(B) When aircraft were being evacuated, enemy fighters were operating near our unit. Nevertheless, personnel used the runway in the normal manner, taxiing into the wind and taking off at an unhurried pace. After takeoff, some circled the airfield before setting course for their destination. This cost us two valuable training aircraft.
(C) Even while enemy aircraft were attacking the airfield, some returning pilots landed by circling as usual and following the prescribed approach route, just as described above.
b. Lessons from air combat against enemy aircraft
1. Earlier combat experience has shown that the enemy is proficient in two-aircraft formation combat. In this engagement as well, the two-aircraft attacks were highly effective. Most of our pilots who failed to return appear to have attacked the lead enemy aircraft and then been shot down by the enemy aircraft following behind. Countermeasures should include:
(A) Making the first attack against the formation’s wingman or following aircraft.
(B) Holding friendly support aircraft in reserve during an attack and using them effectively to support the attacking force.
2. The vertical turning fight is generally disadvantageous; turning combat using vertical turns is highly advantageous. There have been cases in which a combat trainer maneuvered inside the enemy aircraft, making it difficult for the enemy to bring its guns to bear.
3. Gunnery training must be conducted regularly, and hit probability improved. In this engagement, an experienced pilot - a Petty Officer First Class - engaged a superior enemy force, shot down three aircraft, and returned safely. This was certainly due to superior air-combat skill, but also to destroying the enemy with a single, well-placed attack and clearing the combat area quickly. Some younger pilots gained favorable firing positions but failed to score hits, leaving them at a severe disadvantage in the ensuing fight. We must renew our emphasis on the streamer-target gunnery training previously conducted.
4. After attacking from a position of advantage, if no hits are scored and the pilot pulls up, he must remain fully alert to enemy upward-firing attacks. Many pilots, still carrying habits from basic training, pulled up casually or continued straight ahead and were hit. It appears preferable to roll away while turning opposite the enemy’s escape direction and then pull up at some distance—or to continue directly into a vertical pursuit. In either case, special attention to aircraft following from behind is essential.
5. When engaging Zeros, enemy F6Fs appear to prioritize maintaining speed over altitude, preparing in climbing a counterattack from above. Even when we attacked with an altitude advantage of about 1,500 meters, we were repeatedly met with head-on fire and could not deliver effective fire; in some cases, we were instead hit by upward-firing attacks.
6. When pursued by the enemy, the preferred maneuver is to roll into a descending sideslip, or to enter a sharp descending turn while sideslipping. Pulling up into a climbing turn is absolutely inadvisable.
CPO Takanobu Obata, Tsukuba Kōkūtai, Japan, February 1945
Lt Toshihide Kihara, Tsukuba Kōkūtai, Japan, February 1945
2. Measures to limit damage
a. Thoroughly camouflaging aircraft stored in revetments is extremely effective. Our unit had more than 40 aircraft stored in revetments. In some cases, F6F fire was directed chiefly at aircraft undergoing maintenance near the parking line, while other aircraft were left unmolested.
b. Fighter-unit bases must be fortified as an urgent priority. Such bases must continue to shelter friendly fighters until the last possible moment and enable rapid launches for second and third attacks. The need to strengthen antiaircraft ground fire rapidly, in order to stop low-level strafing, requires no further explanation.
c. Various measures needed for air defense are being implemented rapidly. However, matters requiring higher-level approval or cooperation from the facilities department take considerable time to realize and may not be completed in time for the fighting immediately ahead. We feel acutely the need for the facilities department to act more rapidly. The authority of each unit commander should be strengthened, and emergency procedures should be established so that funds and materials can be made available and put to use immediately.
I would like to thank my colleague Martin Ferkl for his help in preparing this article.
Sources:
BOBEK, J.: Tsukuba Kaigun Kōkūtai, INFO 07/2025
Bombing-Fighting Squadron Three (Narrative history)
Commander Task Group 58.4, Operation Order 2-45
JACAR Ref. C13120465300, Tsukuba Naval Air Group Combat Report (No. 3)
HATA, I., IZAWA, Y.: Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units in World War II
HATA, I., IZAWA, Y., SHORES, C.: Japanese Army Air Force Fighter Units and Their Aces, 1931–1945
MORRISON, Samuel E.: Victory in the Pacific, Volume XIV
YOSHINO, Y.: Tsukuba Kōkūtai Fighter Squadron