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TASK FORCE 58 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN
and landing. For example:
(A) Returning fighters were lined up in
a single row, as during routine training, with
no regard for enemy strafing. Aircraft must
instead be dispersed irregularly, with at least
50 meters between them fore and aft and to
either side.
(B) When aircraft were being evacuated,
enemy fighters were operating near our unit.
Nevertheless, personnel used the runway in
the normal manner, taxiing into the wind and
taking off at an unhurried pace. After takeoff,
some circled the airfield before setting course
for their destination. This cost us two valuable
training aircraft.
(C) Even while enemy aircraft were
attacking the airfield, some returning pilots
landed by circling as usual and following the
prescribed approach route, just as described
above.
b. Lessons from air combat against enemy
aircraft
1. Earlier combat experience has shown
that the enemy is proficient in two-aircraft
formation combat. In this engagement as well,
the two-aircraft attacks were highly effective.
Most of our pilots who failed to return appear
to have attacked the lead enemy aircraft and
then been shot down by the enemy aircraft
following behind. Countermeasures should
include:
(A) Making the first attack against the
formation’s wingman or following aircraft.
(B) Holding friendly support aircraft in
reserve during an attack and using them
effectively to support the attacking force.
2. The vertical turning fight is generally
disadvantageous; turning combat using
vertical turns is highly advantageous. There
have been cases in which a combat trainer
maneuvered inside the enemy aircraft, making
it difficult for the enemy to bring its guns to
bear.
3. Gunnery training must be conducted
regularly, and hit probability improved. In this
engagement, an experienced pilot - a Petty
Officer First Class - engaged a superior enemy
force, shot down three aircraft, and returned
safely. This was certainly due to superior air-
combat skill, but also to destroying the enemy
with a single, well-placed attack and clearing
the combat area quickly. Some younger
pilots gained favorable firing positions but
failed to score hits, leaving them at a severe
disadvantage in the ensuing fight. We must
renew our emphasis on the streamer-target
gunnery training previously conducted.
4. After attacking from a position of
advantage, if no hits are scored and the pilot
pulls up, he must remain fully alert to enemy
upward-firing attacks. Many pilots, still
carrying habits from basic training, pulled
up casually or continued straight ahead and
were hit. It appears preferable to roll away
while turning opposite the enemy’s escape
direction and then pull up at some distance—
or to continue directly into a vertical pursuit.
In either case, special attention to aircraft
following from behind is essential.
5. When engaging Zeros, enemy F6Fs appear
to prioritize maintaining speed over altitude,
preparing in climbing a counterattack from
above. Even when we attacked with an altitude
advantage of about 1,500 meters, we were
repeatedly met with head-on fire and could
not deliver effective fire; in some cases, we
were instead hit by upward-firing attacks.
6. When pursued by the enemy, the preferred
maneuver is to roll into a descending sideslip,
or to enter a sharp descending turn while
sideslipping. Pulling up into a climbing turn is
absolutely inadvisable.
2. Measures to limit damage
a. Thoroughly camouflaging aircraft stored
in revetments is extremely effective. Our unit
had more than 40 aircraft stored in revetments.
In some cases, F6F fire was directed chiefly
at aircraft undergoing maintenance near the
parking line, while other aircraft were left
unmolested.
b. Fighter-unit bases must be fortified as an
urgent priority. Such bases must continue to
shelter friendly fighters until the last possible
moment and enable rapid launches for second
and third attacks. The need to strengthen
antiaircraft ground fire rapidly, in order to
stop low-level strafing, requires no further
explanation.
c. Various measures needed for air defense
are being implemented rapidly. However,
matters requiring higher-level approval or
cooperation from the facilities department
take considerable time to realize and may
not be completed in time for the fighting
immediately ahead. We feel acutely the need
for the facilities department to act more
rapidly. The authority of each unit commander
should be strengthened, and emergency
procedures should be established so that
funds and materials can be made available
and put to use immediately.
I would like to thank my colleague Martin Ferkl
for his help in preparing this article.
Sources:
BOBEK J: Tsukuba Kaigun Kōkūtai, INFO 07/2025
Bombing-Fighting Squadron Three (Narrative history)
Commander Task Group 58.4, Operation Order 2-45
JACAR Ref. C13120465300 Tsukuba Naval Air Group Combat
Report (No. 3)
HATA I., IZAWA Y.: Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units
in World War II
HATA I., IZAWA Y., Schores C.: Japanese Army Air Force
Fighter Units and their Aces 1931 - 1945
MORRISON Samuel E.: Victory in the Pacific, Volume XIV
YOSHINO Y.: Tsukuba Kōkūtai Fighter Squadron
Lt Toshihide Kihara, Tsukuba Kōkūtai, Japan, February 1945
INFO Eduard
13
November 2026

TASK FORCE 58 OFF THE COAST OF JAPAN

Lt Toshihide Kihara, Tsukuba Kōkūtai, Japan, February 1945

and landing. For example:

(A) Returning fighters were lined up in a single row, as during routine training, with no regard for enemy strafing. Aircraft must instead be dispersed irregularly, with at least 50 meters between them fore and aft and to either side.

(B) When aircraft were being evacuated, enemy fighters were operating near our unit. Nevertheless, personnel used the runway in the normal manner, taxiing into the wind and taking off at an unhurried pace. After takeoff, some circled the airfield before setting course for their destination. This cost us two valuable training aircraft.

(C) Even while enemy aircraft were attacking the airfield, some returning pilots landed by circling as usual and following the prescribed approach route, just as described above.

b. Lessons from air combat against enemy aircraft

1. Earlier combat experience has shown that the enemy is proficient in two-aircraft formation combat. In this engagement as well, the two-aircraft attacks were highly effective. Most of our pilots who failed to return appear to have attacked the lead enemy aircraft and then been shot down by the enemy aircraft following behind. Countermeasures should include:

(A) Making the first attack against the formation’s wingman or following aircraft.

(B) Holding friendly support aircraft in reserve during an attack and using them effectively to support the attacking force.

2. The vertical turning fight is generally disadvantageous; turning combat using vertical turns is highly advantageous. There have been cases in which a combat trainer maneuvered inside the enemy aircraft, making it difficult for the enemy to bring its guns to bear.

3. Gunnery training must be conducted regularly, and hit probability improved. In this engagement, an experienced pilot - a Petty Officer First Class - engaged a superior enemy force, shot down three aircraft, and returned safely. This was certainly due to superior aircombat skill, but also to destroying the enemy with a single, well-placed attack and clearing the combat area quickly. Some younger pilots gained favorable firing positions but failed to score hits, leaving them at a severe disadvantage in the ensuing fight. We must renew our emphasis on the streamer-target gunnery training previously conducted.

4. After attacking from a position of advantage, if no hits are scored and the pilot pulls up, he must remain fully alert to enemy upward-firing attacks. Many pilots, still carrying habits from basic training, pulled up casually or continued straight ahead and were hit. It appears preferable to roll away while turning opposite the enemy’s escape direction and then pull up at some distance— or to continue directly into a vertical pursuit. In either case, special attention to aircraft following from behind is essential.

5. When engaging Zeros, enemy F6Fs appear to prioritize maintaining speed over altitude, preparing in climbing a counterattack from above. Even when we attacked with an altitude advantage of about 1,500 meters, we were repeatedly met with head-on fire and could not deliver effective fire; in some cases, we were instead hit by upward-firing attacks.

6. When pursued by the enemy, the preferred maneuver is to roll into a descending sideslip, or to enter a sharp descending turn while sideslipping. Pulling up into a climbing turn is absolutely inadvisable.

2. Measures to limit damage

a. Thoroughly camouflaging aircraft stored in revetments is extremely effective. Our unit had more than 40 aircraft stored in revetments. In some cases, F6F fire was directed chiefly

at aircraft undergoing maintenance near the parking line, while other aircraft were left unmolested.

b. Fighter-unit bases must be fortified as an urgent priority. Such bases must continue to shelter friendly fighters until the last possible moment and enable rapid launches for second and third attacks. The need to strengthen antiaircraft ground fire rapidly, in order to stop low-level strafing, requires no further explanation.

c. Various measures needed for air defense are being implemented rapidly. However, matters requiring higher-level approval or cooperation from the facilities department take considerable time to realize and may not be completed in time for the fighting immediately ahead. We feel acutely the need for the facilities department to act more rapidly. The authority of each unit commander should be strengthened, and emergency procedures should be established so that funds and materials can be made available and put to use immediately.

I would like to thank my colleague Martin Ferkl for his help in preparing this article.

Sources: BOBEK J: Tsukuba Kaigun Kōkūtai, INFO 07/2025 Bombing-Fighting Squadron Three (Narrative history) Commander Task Group 58.4, Operation Order 2-45 JACAR Ref. C13120465300 Tsukuba Naval Air Group Combat Report (No. 3) HATA I., IZAWA Y.: Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units in World War II HATA I., IZAWA Y., Schores C.: Japanese Army Air Force Fighter Units and their Aces 1931 - 1945 MORRISON Samuel E.: Victory in the Pacific, Volume XIV YOSHINO Y.: Tsukuba Kōkūtai Fighter Squadron

November 2026

INFO Eduard

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